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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20010056-SC
vs.
LUIS PENA-FLORES,

Priority No. 13

Defendant/Petitioner,

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5). The decision of the Court of Appeals is
found as follows: American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, 14 P.3d 6985
cert granted, 26 P.3d 235 (2001).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that a person can be guilty of

interference with a peace officer under Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 even when the
underlying arrest or detention is later determined to be unlawful so long as the officer was
acting within the scope of his authority and the detention or arrest had the indicia of being
lawful? This Court reviews the interpretation of statutes for correctness. State v. Redd,
1999 UT 108 at If 11, 992 P.2d 986. On certiorari, this Court reviews the decisions of the
Court of Appeals for correctness and affords no deference to its conclusions. State v.
James, 2000 UT 80 atfl85 13 P.3d 576.

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 (1999)
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with
the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful
order;
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Luis Pena-Flores appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his

conviction from Fourth District Court for interference with a peace officer, a class B
misdemeanor.

2

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Luis Pena-Flores was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court,

American Fork Department, on August 17, 1999, with Interference with a Peace Officer,
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 and American
Fork City Ordinance § 76-8-305 (R. 6).
On October 8, 1999, a trial was held before the Honorable Howard Maetani (R.
17-18, 32). At the close of the City's case, Pena-Flores moved to dismiss the charge
against him on two grounds: One, that Pena-Flores had not interfered with the lawful
arrest or detention of anyone present (R. 32 at 24). Two, that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that Pena-Flores' actions impeded the arrest of anyone present
(R. 32 at 29). The City responded that Pena-Flores lacked standing "to contest the arrest
or detention of other persons" and that he only had standing to contest "the arrest or
detention of himself' (R. 32 at 25-26).
The trial court convicted Pena-Flores under subsection (3) of § 76-8-305 (R. 32 at
32). Judge Maetani concluded that whether the officers made a lawful arrest is not the
issue; and that the true issue was whether Pena-Flores "impeded the officer's performing
any act to detain individuals and to gather information to then effectuate a lawful arrest"
(R. 32 at 32-33). Pena-Flores was ordered to pay a $100.00 fine and was placed on court
probation for twelve months (R. 19-23).
On October 12, 1999, Pena-Flores appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of
Appeals (R. 24-25). On November 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed his
conviction. American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, 14 P.3d 698.

3

On January 16, 2001, Pena-Flores petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.
This Court granted the petition on May 18, 2001. American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 26
P.3d 235.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Andre Leavitt, a police officer with Provo City, testified that he was currently
assigned to the Utah County Task Force on gang activity and narcotics (R. 32 at 4). As
part of his duties, Leavitt was in American Fork on July 10, 1999, to assist the city with
their Steel Days carnival in case any fights broke out between rival gangs (R. 32 at 4-5).
Leavitt testified that they had received information that a Payson gang may be planning to
retaliate against an American Fork gang (R. 32 at 5-6). The officers were also planning
to I D . "all of the people who were hanging out with known gang members, who through
association could have been" at a fight the previous night at the carnival or at a fight the
previous week in Pleasant Grove (R. 32 at 11-12).
Leavitt testified that approximately ten officers with the task force were present at
the carnival (R. 32 at 6). The officers were dressed in black shirts and hats that had
"Police" written on them (Id.). The officers identified gang members from Provo,
Payson, and American Fork (R. 32 at 6-7). The officers escorted these gang members
from the back corner of the carnival up to the front (R. 32 at 7-8). The officers had the
kids fill out field interview cards and Leavitt took photographs of them (R. 32 at 8). No
illegal activity had been observed by the officers at the carnival (R. 32 at 23).
While the kids were being detained by the officers, Pena-Flores told them that they
did not have to answer any questions from the officers or allow them to take their pictures
4
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In affirming Pena-Flores* conviction the Court of Appeals invented a test which
ignores the plain language of the interference statute and its legislative history, and which
cites to language from an entirely unrelated statute. Moreover, the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 violates the Fourth .Amendment by
reading out of the statute the requirement that the interference or impedance be with a
"lawful" detention or arrest.
Finally, Pena-Flores asserts that his conviction must be reversed because the police
lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain the gang members and that
accordingly he did not interfere with—or impede—officers seeking to effect a lawful
detention.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION AND ITS INTERPRETATION
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-8-305 IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE, THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, OR THIS COURT'S
DECISIONS IN STATE V. BRADSHAWAND STATE V. GARDNER
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the officers' encounter
with the gang members was a level-two detention and therefore, it constituted a "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and must be supported by reasonable
suspicion to be lawful. American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at ^ 11.
However, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the use of 'lawful' in section 76-8-305
does not automatically incorporate this standard in determining whether a person is guilty
of interfering with a peace officer" and that "[defendant's argument that the statute
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language in its interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305. Recently this Court
reiterated its long-standing approach to interpreting statutes: When faced with a question
of statutory construction "we seek to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of
the purpose the act was meant to achieve. In doing so, we look [first] to the plain
language of the [statute].,. We need not look beyond the plain language of [the] provision
unless we find some ambiguity in it." State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68 at \ 7, 427 Utah Adv.
Rep. 35 (citations omitted). Pena-Flores asserts that the plain language of § 76-8-305 is
not ambiguous and that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the plain language of
the statute.
Moreover, a person is guilty of a crime only if the person's actions and state of
mind fit within the statutory defmtional elements of the crime. See Gardner, 814 P.2d at
574. The necessary elements for conviction under of § 76-8-305(3) are as follows:
1.

Pena-Flores had knowledge, or by reasonable care should have had
knowledge that

2.

the police officers were seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention

3.

of himself or another; and

4.

he interfered by refusing to refrain from performing any act that would
impede the arrest or detention.

The plain language of the statute creates a crime only when there is interference with
police officers who are "seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention" (emphasis added).
In contrast, interference with officers who are effecting an unlawful detention or arrest
does not violate the statute. Any other interpretation would "'render [the term lawful]
mere surplusage.'" Gardner, 814 P.2d at 577 (J. Stewart, dissenting) (quoting State v.
Wilkerson, 755 P.2d 471, 477 (Idaho Ct. App.), affd, 766 P.2d 1238 (Idaho 1988)). Pena8

Flores asserts that for a detention or arrest to be lawful it must be supported by reasonable
and articulable suspicion or probable cause.
The legal definition of the term "lawful" supports this reading. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "lawful" as "[n]ot contrary to law; permitted by law." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

at 892 (7th ed. 1999). Black's similarly defines "lawful arrest" as "[t]he

taking of a person into legal custody either under a valid warrant or on probable cause."
Id. at 104. Clearly the term "lawful" connotes a seizure or detention supported by
reasonable suspicion or an arrest based on probable cause.
Moreover, any definition of the term "lawful" must be examined in relation to what
is permissible under the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. Utah courts
have repeatedly recognized that there are three levels of "constitutionally permissible
encounters between police officers and the public":
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long
as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if
the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about
to commit a crime; however the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer
than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed
or is being committed.
State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Smith, 781 P.2d
879, 881 (Utah App. 1989) and State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987).
Accordingly, any examination of the plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305
and the term "lawful" must be made with consideration as to what is constitutionally
permissive. For a police detention of citizens to be lawful under the constitution it must
9

be supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime. Similarly, for an arrest to be lawful it must be supported by
probable cause that an offense has been committed or is being committed.
In addition, the plain language of the interference statute codified at Utah Code
Annotated § 76-8-305 makes no reference to "a scope of authority" standard such as that
adopted by the Court of Appeals in its interpretation of the statute. 2000 UT App 323 at ^
11.
Pena-Flores asserts that interference with unconstitutional and unlawful seizures by
police cannot be justified under any pretense that such acts fall within the scope of
authority; and that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statutes "seeking to effect"
language as dileneated in its "scope of authority" standard completely reads out of the
statute's plain language the requirement that the arrest or detention be lawful.
Accordingly, Pena-Flores asserts that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code
Annotated § 76-8-305 is contrary to the statute's plain language and should be corrected
by this Court.

B.

The Court of Appeals interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305
misconstrues the Legislature's intent in amending the statute following this
Court's decision in State v. Bradshaw.
Even should this Court conclude that the term "lawful" is ambiguous, the Court of

Appeals' interpretation (and its scope of authority test) is not supported by the legislative
history of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 as it is currently codified.
In 1981, the legislature amended the interference statute in response to this Court's
decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975). In Bradshaw, this Court
concluded that the previous version of the interfering statute was unconstitutionally vague.
10

541 P.2d at 801, 802-805. The statute as it then existed read: "A person is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor when he intentionally interferes with a person recognized to be a law
enforcement official seeking to effect an arrest or detention of himself or another
regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the arrest." In other words, at the time it
did not matter if the detention or arrest was lawful. All that was required for conviction
was that law enforcement officers be "seeking to effect an arrest or detention." In
Bradshaw, both a two-judge plurality and a concurring justice found the statute
unconstitutionally vague because the phrase "regardless of whether there is a legal basis
for the arrest" could have any number of interpretations and because the statute could
"penalize a law-abiding citizen by incarceration because he did not willingly submit to an
unlawful arrest." 541 P.2d at 801, 802-805.
The 1981 amendment to the interference statute-which is the statute at issuemakes it a crime to interfere with police officers who are "seeking to effect a lawful arrest
or detention." 1981 Utah Laws, ch. 62, § 1. During the floor debates in the House of
Representatives, the bill's sponsor, Representative Harrison, detailed this Court's decision
in Bradshaw as the impetus for amending the statute. Floor Debate, 42nd Utah Leg., Gen.
Sess. (January 19, 1981) (House Recording no. 3, side A). See, Addenda. Harrison
explained to the House that a statewide body of prosecutor's had drafted the amendment
"to require a lawful arrest" as a condition to the crime of interference. Id. Moreover, in
response to a question, Harrison defined "an unlawful arrest" as one made by police
without "reasonable grounds or cause to do so without probable cause." Id.

In addition,

when another representative expressed concern that the term "lawful" could be vague,
Representative Harrison indicated that court decisions had defined-and would defme-the
lawfulness of arrests (or detentions). Id.
11

Pena-Flores asserts that the legislative history confirms that the Utah Legislature
only intended to criminalize interference to arrests or detentions when the police have
"reasonable grounds... or probable cause." Furthermore, the legislature was aware of the
concerns expressed by this Court in Bradshaw and accordingly included in Utah Code
Annotated
§ 76-8-305 the requirement that police have an underlying "lawful" basis for arresting or
detaining persons.
Accordingly, Pena-Flores requests that this Court correct the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that "the use of 'lawful' in section 76-8-305 does not automatically
incorporate" the requirement that the interference be with a level-two detention or levelthree arrest. American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at Tf 11.

C.

The Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 is not
in accordance with this Court's decision in State v. Gardner.
In adopting its "scope of authority" test, the Court of Appeals indicated that this

interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 is similar to that adopted by this Court
in State v. Gardner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), and by the Court of Appeals in State v.
Griego, 933 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1997). American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT
App 323 at ^f 12. Pena-Flores respectfully asserts that the Court of Appeals' reliance on
Gardner and Griego is misplaced.
First, at issue in Gardner was an interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5102.4 (1990)-which concerns the crime of assaulting a police officer-and the right of an
individual to forcefully resist an illegal search. In this case, Pena-Flores did not
demonstrate any force in his interference or resistence. Moreover, all references made by
this Court in Gardner to police acting within the scope of his or her authority arise from
12

the plain language of § 76-5-102.4 which reads: "Any person who assaults a peace officer,
with knowledge that he is a police officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the
scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor" (emphasis
added). Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 does not contain such language but requires that
the officers be seeking to effect a lawful detention or arrest.
Second, this Court convicted Gardner of interference with an officer under § 76-8305 not because he resisted the officers' warrantless, illegal entry into the building but
because he interfered with the officers' attempts to place him under arrest after he had
committed the crime of assault on a police officer by punching the officer in the face
again. Gardner, 814 P.2d at 575. Similarly, in Griego, the defendant hit and kicked
several officers after they entered his home and seized him without a warrant. 933 P.2d at
1006. Moreover, Griego resisted so loudly the seizure that several neighbors exited their
homes to investigate the ruckus. 933 P.2d at 1008. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
police had lawfully arrested Griego for interference because he had violated the disorderly
conduct statute when he disturbed is neighbors "well before he was arrested." Griego,
933 P.2d at 1008. Accordingly, both Gardner and Griego present cases where the police
had a lawful basis to arrest the defendant prior to the interference; and therefore, neither
decision had construes the language of the interference statute. In this case, however,
there were no intervening illegal acts either by Pena-Flores or the "gang" members which
would cure the taint of the officers' actions in seizing the gang members without
reasonable suspicion and which would create a lawful arrest or detention against which
Pena-Flores interfered.
Accordingly, Pena-Flores requests that this Court conclude that the Court of
Appeals' reliance on Gardner and Griego is misplaced and that the "scope of authority"
13

standard adopted by the Court of Appeals is inapplicable to Utah Code Annotated § 76-8305.

D.

The Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305
violates the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Pena-Flores asserts that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code

Annotated § 76-8-305 violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution because unconstitutional and unlawful seizures
by police cannot be justified under any pretense that such acts fall within the scope of
authority. In addition,

"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded...

than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citation omitted).
While the previous version of the interference statute—which did not require a legal
basis for the arrest or detention-was struck down on vagueness grounds, this Court in
Gardner noted that the Bradshaw majority concluded in dictum that:
If the intention of the legislature was to penalize a law-abiding citizen by
incarceration because he [or she] did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest, a
statute authorizing the same is in violation of both the Utah and United States
Constitutions... in that it permits and authorizes an arrest without probable cause
and without lawful basis for the arrest.
Gardner, 814 P.2d at 571 (quoting Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 801). Pena-Flores asserts that a
statute which punishes a citizen for pointing out that police are effecting an unlawful
detention is likewise unconstitutional because it permits and authorizes the sei2^ire of
14

citizens without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and without lawful basis for the
detention. Pena-Flores further asserts that the "scope of authority" test invented by the
Court of Appeals in this case creates just such a statute and is therefore, unconstitutional.
Moreover, due process demands that "one cannot be punished for failing to obey
the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the Constitution." Wright
v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1963). Likewise, due process demands that one not be
punished for simply informing individuals that an officer's command is unlawful and
unconstitutional.
In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that "whether the police had
reasonable suspicion to justify" the detention of the gang members "is immaterial to
defendant's conviction" because the officers' were acting within the scope of their
authority and the detention had the indicia of being lawful—the officers were in uniform,
acting as police officers and were conducting police business. American Fork City v.
Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at ^ 16, 17. Therefore, the officers were "seeking to
effect" a lawful detention. 2000 UT App 323 at % 16. However, this interpretation of
Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 and the Court of Appeals' misplaced emphasis on the
terms "seeking to effect" effectively gives police discretion as to whether the Fourth
Amendment protections are applicable to any given situation. Moreover, it effectively
reads the "lawfulness" requirement out of the statute by protecting all police conduct that
is accomplished while acting in an official capacity.
Pena-Flores asserts that any interpretation of a statute which allows the punishment
of a law-abiding citizen because he did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest~or
because he simply pointed out that police are effecting an unlawful detention—violates
both the United States and Utah Constitutions because it permits and authorizes the
15

seizure and/or arrest of citizens without reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal
activity and without lawful basis for the detention or arrest. Pena-Flores asserts that the
Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 creates just such an
unconstitutional statute and that this interpretation must be corrected by this Court.

E.

The police detention of the gang members was not supported by reasonable
suspicion.
Pena-Flores asserts that, contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, whether the

police had reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of the gang members is not only
material to the issue of his conviction but is dispositive. See, American Fork City v. PenaFlores, 2000 UT App 323 at ^ 17. As discussed supra for Pena-Flores to be properly
convicted of interference with a peace officer, his interference or impedance must be in a
situation where the police were seeking to effect a lawful arrest (supported by probable
cause) or detention (supported by reasonable suspicion).
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the encounter between
the police and the gang members was a level-two encounter which required reasonable
suspicion to be legal. In other words, to properly detain individuals the officers must be
able to "point to specific, articulable facts, which together with rational inferences drawn
from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude" that a crime had been
committed or was about to be committed. State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Utah
App. 1997). See also, State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994).
Pena-Flores asserts that the specific set of facts which are present here concerning
the detention of the gang members do not give rise to "reasonable suspicion" and
therefore, Pena-Flores' conviction must be reversed because he did not interfere with—or
impede—the police seeking to effect a lawful detention. Officer Leavitt admitted that
16

neither he nor the other ten officers that were involved in the detention of the gang
members had observed any illegal activity (R. 32 at 23). The officers were present at the
carnival in case any fights broke out and because they had received information that there
"might be a problem" (R. 32 at 4-5, 24). However, at the time of the detention no such
problem had arisen.
Moreover, Officer Leavitt could point to no specific, articulable facts that any of
the individuals detained were actually involved in the fight that had occurred either on the
previous night or the previous week. In fact, Leavitt's testimony establishes only that the
officers were planning to I.D. a interview "all of the people who were hanging out with
known gang members, who through association could have been" at a fight the previous
night at the carnival or a fight the previous week in Pleasant Grove (R. 32 at 11-12).
Pena-Flores asserts that "could have been" involved in illegal activity is insufficient to
establish that any of the detained individuals "had committed or was about to commit a
crime." Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1228.
Accordingly, because the officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to
detain the gang members, Pena-Flores asserts that his conviction for interference must be
reversed because he did not interfere with~or impede-officers seeking to effect a lawful
detention.

17

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Pena-Flora asks that this Court reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals and his conviction for interference with a peace officer.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Zr day of October, 2001.

Margaret FT Lindsay
Counsel for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this^Tday of October, 2001.
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AMERICAN FORK CITY, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Luis PENA-FLORES, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 990901-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 16, 2000.
Defendant was convicted, after a ber)c^
trial in the District Court, American
F o rk
Department. Howard H. Maetani, J., of *n"
terference with a peace officer. Defend£nt
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwo^,
P.J., held that: (1) the encounter betwe en
police officers and gang members was a de'
tendon: (2) the detention did not have to ®e
lawful, for purposes of interference with a
peace officer, as long as the officers w£ re
acting \\Vitim t'ne scope oi t\ie\r authority -a1™
the detention had the indicia of being law^u*>
(3) the detention of the gang members frac*
indicia of being lawful.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law «3=>1158(1)
In determining whether the police en~
counter was a detention, the appellate co u r t
would review the trial court's factual findi*1^
under a clearly erroneous standard, # n "
would review its conclusions based on t n e
totality of those facts, for correctness.
2. Criminal Law e=>l 134(3)
A question of statutory interpretat 10n
presents a question of law, which is revie^*ec*
for correctness.
a. Criminal Law <3»1224(tt
In a consensual encounter, an of# cer
may approach a citizen at any time and p o s e
questions, so long as the citizen is not detained against his will.
4. Arrest o=»63.5(4)
An officer may seize a person if t n e
officer ha& an articulable suspicion that ^ e

person has committed or is about r,j
^
a crime.
5. Arrest C=>6$< 4)
The difference between a tur^r-s^
counter and a detention i.s wr.etner. :ar»j^
a show of physical force or authors. a ^
son believes his freedom of mo\eme»fc
restrained.
6. Arrest <S>68(4)
The determination of whether a
is detained focuses on whether the "%
per^
remained, not in the spirit of cooperate
with the officer's investigation, but bee**
he believed he was not free to lea\ e
7. Arrest <3=>68(4)
Encounter between police and g*»
members at carnival was a "detention,*
where police were interviewing and phot*
graphing, for purposes of investigate
known gang members behe\ ed to ha\ e beet
involved in a fight the previous night, tat
police were physically escoiting the mdmd*
als from the back of the carnival to the fro*
of the carnival.
See publication Wordb and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

8. Obstructing Justice c=7
Although police must have reasonabk
suspicion in order to make a legal detentkl
the use of 'lawful/' in statute defining i
ference with a peace officer as including »•
terference when a "peace officer ^ seeking*
effect a lawful arrest or detention of thtf
person or another," does not automatical
incorporate the reasonable suspicion sb£
dard; rather, so long as the peace officer 1
acting within the scope of his or her authdfr
ty and the detention or arre.-t has the indkt
of being lawful, a person can be guilty*
interfering with a Deace officer, even ***•:?
the arrest or detention is later determined»
be unlawful. U.C.A.1953, 7»>-S-305(3),
9. Statutes 0181(1), 184
When* construing a statute, the coarf»>;
primary purpose is to gi\ e effect to the **
tent of the Legislature, m light of the f*
pose the statute was meant to achie\e.
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tesO^lSS, 212.6
court presumes that the Legislature
\i,-r :errri :r. the statute advisedly, and
erreet to each term according to its
^ -ury and accepted meaning.
• t Obstructing Justice e=>7
Poiice officers' detention of gang memhad indicia of being lawful, as element
./*:erference with a peace officer, even if
oncers lacked reasonable suspicion for
_ Mentions, where officers were wearing
^ v marked police uniforms and were in•^•uting known gang members and people
s^-xuting with the gang members to gather
^formation about two previous fights that
vjj recently occurred. U.C.A.1953, 76-Sr~e

Mirraret P. Lindsay, Aldrich, Neson,
W«*ht & Esplin. Provo, for Appellant.

police believed there was a possibility of
gang activity. Additionally, police were
aware of gang fights the previous night and a
week earlier between an American Fork
gang and a Payson gang. Based on reports,
police believed that the Payson gang might
be coming to American Fork to retaliate for
the fight that occurred a week earlier.
11 3 During the carnival, officers dressed in
clearly marked police uniforms observed
known gang members congregating in the
back corner of the carnival. Having identified the gang members, the officers proceeded to interview them and fill out interview
cards for their files. Duiing this process,
police targeted certain individuals, whom
they identified by tattoos and monikers, and
escorted them to the front of the carnival,
where the officers filled out interview cards
and photographed them.

Jjnio Tucker Hansen and Bruce Murjx-k, Duval Hansen Witt & Moreley LLC,
Laerican Fork, for Appellee.

U 4 While poiice were interviewing the
gang members, defendant, who was associating with them, but who was not known to
police, told his friends that they did not have
Before Judges GREENWOOD, BENCH,
to talk with police or allow the police to take
•ad BILLINGS.
their pictures. The poiice officers told defendant to shut his mouth and step back from
OPINION
the situation. Defendant, however, persisted
GREENWOOD. Presiding Judge:
in telling his friends that they did not have to
11 Defendant appeals his conviction of cooperate. At this point Officer Leavitt told
laterference with a Peace Officer in violation defendant he had become "part of the party"
* Utah Code Ann. <j 76-8-305, arguing that and instructed him to come up to the front to
»r«?r*nn cannot interfere unless an officer is be interviewed. Once defendant was taken
**k^g to make a lawful arrest or detention. to the front. Officer Leavitt asked him for
tWcndant argues that either the gang mem- some identification. Defendant told Officer
fcrs were not detained or, in the alternative, Leavitt that he did not have to show him his
* they were detained, the detention was not identification. Officer Leavitt asked defen**fal. Thus, defendant claims under either dant if he had any identification with him.
theory that he was not interfering with a Defendant responded that he had some in his
**ful arrest or detention as required by the pocket. Officer Leavitt told defendant to
**«*. We affirm.
show him the identification, but defendant
refused. Officer Leavitt told defendant he
BACKGROUNDl
was under arrest for failure to provide infor1
- On July 10, 1999, members of the Pro- mation to a police officer, handcuffed him,
^ty Police Department were present in and removed the identification. After a
^erican Fork to help patroj the Steel Days bench trial, defendant was convicted of interT^'al. Based on information received fering with a peace officer. Defendant now
^ street contacts and anonymous tips, appeals his conviction.
e

relevant facts of this ca*e are not in dis-

pute.
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

tions omitted). In a level-two encon^
an officer may seize a person if the oft?
has an 'articulable suspicion' that the iw*
has committed or is about to coning
crime.
Id. (citations omitted). The*
fere nee between a consensual level-one
counter and a level-two detention is \vh*^
"'through a show of physical force or autW
ty, a person believes his freedom of Q ^
ment is restrained." Id. Furthermore, %
determination of whether a person is 4
tained focuses on u 'whether defendant %
mainfed], not in the spirit of cooperation^
the officer's investigation, but because fc
believfed] he [was] not free to leave.'*'" JJ
(citations omitted).

[1,2] *l 5 This case presents two questions: (1) Was the police encounter with
gang members a detention, and (2) does
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 require a lawful
arrest or detention in order for a defendant
to be charged with interfering with an officer? In determining whether the encounter
was a detention, we review the trial court's
factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard and its "conclusions based on the
totality of those facts for correctness." State
v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct.App.
1997). A question of statutory interpretation
presents a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness. See State v. Widdison 2000
UT App 1S5, H 16, 4 P.3d 100; State v. Wes[7] 118 In this case, the facts indicate 4i
terman, 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah Ct.App.
the police interview of the gang merabei
1997).
was a level-two detention. Specifically, at
only were police interviewing and phefc.
ANALYSIS
graphing known gang members believed |
I. Was the Encounter a Level-Two De- have been involved in a fight the previa*
night, but also police were physically esoiv
tention
ing
these individuals from the back of lb
H 6 Defendant argues that the encounter
carnival
to the front of the carnival. Offio*
between police and gang members was mereLeavitt
testified that the officers had fc
ly a consensual level-one encounter, and thus
tained
the
gang members for purposes of tit
he cannot be convicted of interfering with a
investigation.
Based on the facts and OflSoar
peace officer because the statute requires
Leavitt's
testimony,
we cannot say the trif
either a level-two detention or a level-three
court's
conclusion
that
police had detamrf
arrest. Section 76-8-305 states:
the gang members was clearly erroneoa
A person is guilty of a class B misde119 The State argues that the "seeking *
meanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have effect" statutorv language shows the Legifc
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking ture intended the statute to cover a b r o »
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of range of encounters than only detentions a*
that person or another and interferes with arrests. However, because we conclude th*
the arrest or detention by . . . the arrested the police did detain the gang members,*
person's or another person's refusal to re- decline to address whether a person couWh
frain from performing any act that would lawfully arrested for interfering with a le*»
one encounter.
impede the arrest or detention.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(3) (1999) (emII. Does Section 76-8-305 Require
phasis added).
Lawful Detention
[3-6] H 7 Defendant argues that police
were merely gathering information from the
gang members, and thus the encounter was a
consensual level-one encounter. In a consensual level-one encounter, " ' "an officer may
approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will." ' " State v. Struhs,
940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (cita-

H 10 Next, defendant argues that the <•
tention of the gang members was not S?
ported by reasonable suspicion, and thus*
conviction must be reversed because the st*
ute requires a ''lawful arrest or detenu**
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999). A s *
fendant points out: "In order to J u S ® .
seizure, a police officer must 'point to spe»*
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fl 13 Although Gardiner and Griego could
be distinguished on the ground that both
involved a prior illegal police act which was
superseded by a lawful arrest that formed
the basis of the interference charge, such a
distinction is against the clear weight of authority and the language in the statute. Other states that have examined this issue have
ui * 11 Although police must have rea- consistently determined that illegal police
cible suspicion in order to make a legal conduct does not justify a defendant interferfr*jfr.t:on. the use of "lawful" in section 76-8-ing with a detention or arrest. See, e.g.,
%6 i<^ n o t automatically incorporate this Jurco v. State, $25 P.2d 909, 911, 914 (Alaska
• •-iiard in determining whether a person is Ct.App.1992) (defendant could not resist ar, j v ,)f interfering with a peace officer. So rest even though disorderly conduct charge
ri & a police officer is acting within the was invalid); People v. Curtis, 70 Cal.2d 347,
x-xe of his or her authority and the deten- 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33, 36-37 (1969)
v-r. T arrest has the indicia of being lawful, (duty to refrain from resisting unlawful ari yrrs-on can be guilty of interfering with a rest does not violate Fourth Amendment pro-• i.-e officer even when the arrest or deten- hibition against unreasonable seizures); Kes•j.r. is later determined to be unlawful. As sler v. Barowsky. 129 Idaho 647, 931 P.2d
** wiir: discussed; "The determination of 641, 650 (1997) (person cannot resist arrest if
*v.her an airest is lawful is often difficult he knows he is being arrested by a police
•..: should not be left to bystanders who may officer); State v. Logan, 8 Kan.App.2d 232,
uve only a limited knowledge of the relevant 654 P.2d 492, 495 (19S2) (person cannot resist
JT and who may let their emotions control arrest by law enforcement even if he believes
•Jfcr judgment." State v. Holeman, 103 arrest is unlawful); State v. Laughlin, 281
Mont. 179, 933 P.2d 813, 814-15 (1997)
W*h2d 426. 693 P.2d 89, 92 (1985).
(same); Fug ere v. State, Taxation and Reve112 Furthermore, the Utah Supreme nue Dep'L Motor Vehicle Dm, 120 N.M. 29,
Cant has adopted a similar rule. In State v. 897 P.2d 216, 223 (N.M.Ct.App.1995) (legal
'>.niir.€r. 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), defen- challenge to unlawful arrest can be raised
iir.t was convicted of both assaulting a police after the arrest, rather than by resisting
suiter and interfering with an arrest. In arrest); State v. Castle, 48 OrApp. 15, 616
case, defendant claimed that the officer P.2d 510, 512 (1980) (generally person cannot
%
-*i illegally entered a private building to resist arrest even when person know? he is
^•^'^ate suspected criminal activity. See innocent); State v. Mather, 28 WashApp.
*i at 575. Defendant claimed his initial 700, 626 P.2d 44. 47 (1981) (right to be free
**ault against the officer when the officer from unreasonable search and seizure does
«*ered the building and resistance after be- not create right to react unreasonably to an
** informed that he was under arrest were illegal detention).
;^ti!:ed because the underlying search by
-1* officer was illegal. See id. The supreme
U 14 As the Wyoming Supreme Court not^
rejected this argument, stating; "The ed; "The legislative intent to prohibit that
p 1 that his attempted search was later which would interfere with law enforcement
•'*nd to be unlawful does not divest [the officers as they go about their duties is mani';-**r] of his authority." Id. Similarly, in fest. A person of common intelligence need
vote Gnego, 933 P.2d 1003 (Utah CtApp. not guess at the meaning and intended appliw
e assumed that "the police officers' cation of the statute." Newton v. State, 698
^""antless entry into defendant's home and *P.2d 1149, 1152 (Wyo.1985). We believe that
** seizure were illegal." Id. at 1008. De- it is equally clear that our Legislature, by
**•* this illegality, we upheld defendant's enacting section 76-8-305, intended to prom -TOon lor interfering with an officer.
tect law enforcement officers who seek to
Nf
'd. at 1Q09.
discharge their official duties.
tact* which, together with ranees
•—
drawn from those facts,
:r.:ere
eiiii a reasonable person to conclude
iuntj had committed or was about
,
a crime/" State v. Struhs, 940
... Tn l :''
:225. l-- s ^ U t a h Ct.App.1997) (alterarlnai) (citation omitted).
y e in on:
c
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[9,10] 1 15 "When construing a statute,
our primary purpose is to give effect to the
intent of the Legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve."
State c. Widdison. 2000 UT App 185, H 21, 4
P.3d 100 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Additionally. " 'we presume that
the Legislature used each term advisedly,
and we give effect to each term according to
its ordinary and accepted meaning.'" Id.
(citation omitted).
1116 Defendant's argument that the statute
requires a lawful arrest or detention reads
out of the statute the phrase "seeking to
effect." Given our prior case law and the
Legislature's inclusion of the "seeking to effect" language, we believe that the statute is
intended to protect law enforcement officers
who are either making a lawful detention or
arrest, or who are seeking to effect a lawful
detention or arrest. An officer can seek to
effect a lawful arrest or detention when he or
she is acting within the scope of his or her
authority and the detention or arrest has the
indicia of being lawful.
[11] 1117 In this case, the police officers
were wearing clearly marked police uniforms
and were investigating known gang members
and people associating with these gang members to gather information about two previous fights that had recently occurred. Additionally, the police officers had information
that one gang might be attempting to retaliate against another gang for one of the previous fights. To this end, police officers briefly
detained these individuals to gather information and update their tiles. Whether the
police had reasonable suspicion to justify this
detention is immaterial to defendant's conviction, because defendant was in no position to
determine on his own whether the officers'
actions were lawful.
CONCLUSION
U 18 Based on the evidence presented, the
trial court correctly determined that police
had seized the gang members at the carnival.
Furthermore, the police wore uniforms which
clearly identified them as law enforcement
officers and they were acting in a manner
that had all the indicia of a lawful police
detention. Therefore, defendant's interfer-

ence with the police investigation
es
cient to support a conviction under
76-8-305(3). Accordingly, we afrlrrn
dant's conviction.
11 19 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL ',Y
BENCH, Judge, JUDITH M. BILLING^
Judge.

KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

2000 UT App 333

Daniel D. PRICE, Susanne Q. Price, fee*
Swensen, Kay Swensen, Ross LamA^
and Carma Larrabee, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSEXGB
CORPORATION;
Southern Padfc
Transportation Company, a Delanw*
corporation; and South Jordan Crtr, *
Utah municipal corporation, Defen
and Appellees.
No. 990554-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 24, 2000.
Parents of driver and passengers A>
were killed in collision between trxn vi
vehicle brought wrongful death *^**
against railroads and city. The Third Di$3*$.
Salt Lake Department, Anne M. Surbt, L
granted defendants' motions for suxaotff
judgment, and parents appealed. The 0«*
of Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) n*
roads had no duty to upgrade warning **
vices at crossing where collision occurred*
to urge Department of Transportation (DW
to do so, even if crossing was more xm
ordinarily hazardous; (2) parents' exce***
speed tort claim against railroads
preempted by National Railroad Safety ^
(NRSA); (3) train operator's duty*to W 1
did not arise, as a matter of law, until « ^
dents' car drove onto railroad tracss
there was no genuine issue of material a*1
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Chad A. GARDINER, Defendant
and Petitioner.
No. 890231.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 18, 1991.
Defendant was convicted, in the
Eighth Circuit Court, Uintah County, A.
Lynn Payne, J., of assaulting a peace officer and interfering with a peace officer.
He appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed and denied petition for rehearing.
The Supreme Court granted defendant's
writ of certiorari, and Zimmerman, J., held
that defendant was not justified in forcibly
resisting police officer's attempt to search
business premises, even though search was
later determined to be illegal.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., filed dissenting opinion.
Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, filed
dissenting opinion in which Stewart, J.,
joined.
1. Courts <s=>103
Opinion that established new rule of
Utah law and opinion that dealt with dicta
in another case which appeared to be flatly
contrary to new rule of law should have
been published. Rules App.Proc, Rule 31.
2. Searches and Seizures <S=>24
Absent one of narrow category of exigent circumstances, warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable under Fourth
Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
3. Courts <s=>92
Supreme Court was not bound by earlier dicta.
4. Constitutional Law <s=*70.1(10)
Supreme Court was not free to reject
English common-law right to forcibly resist
illegal arrest because legislature had already acted in that area by abolishing all

common-law crimes and codifying crimes
and defenses. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-105.
5. Assault and Battery e=>63
Where police officer who attempted to
search business did not act wholly outside
scope of his authority, defendant could not
forcibly resist officer and, thus, defendant
was properly convicted of assaulting peace
officer, for punching officer after officer
pushed him and after officer told him he
was under arrest, even though officer's
attempted search was illegal. U.C.A.1953,
76-S-102.4.
6. Criminal Law ^260.11(2, 4)
In cases involving mixed questions of
fact and law where judge makes determination on contested facts, Supreme Court
views evidence in light most favorable to
trial court's ruling and reverses only if
necessary factual findings implicit in
court's ruling lack sufficient evidentiary
support. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a).
7. Obstructing Justice e=»3, 8
Defendant who punched police officer
and fought with him after officer informed
defendant that he was under arrest was
properly convicted of interfering with
peace officer, and fact that officer's underlying search was illegal did not justify attack on officer. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-305.
8. Obstructing Justice <s=>7
Statute giving individual right to use
reasonable force to prevent or terminate
unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation did not apply in case in which defendant forcibly resisted police officer who
attempted to search place of business.
U.C.A.1953, 76-2-405.
9. Obstructing Justice <3=7
Neither statute giving individual right
to use force to prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property nor
statute giving individual right to use reasonable force to prevent or terminate unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation were intended to include right to use
force against peace officers acting in
course of their duties. U.C.A.1953, 76-2405, 76-2-406.

STATE v. GARDINER

Utah

569

Cite as 814 ?2d 568 (Utah 1991)

?:. Paul Van Dam. David B Thompson,
Sal: Lake City, for State of Utah.
Harry* H. Souvall, Vernal, for Gardiner.
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant Chad Gardiner appeals from a
conviction of assaulting a peace officer under section 76-5-102.4 of the Code and a
conviction of interfering with a peace officer under section 76-8-305 of the Code.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102.4, 76-8-305
(1990). These convictions arose out of an
incident in which Gardiner refused to permit an officer to conduct a search of the
premises where a party was in progress.
Gardiner claims that he had a right to
forcibly resist the officer's illegal search
and the ensuing arrest.
Gardiner's claims on appeal are several.
First, he argues that he had a right to
resist because in State v. Bradshaw, 541
P.2d 800 (Utah 1975), this court recognized
a citizen's common law right to forcibly
resist an illegal arrest by a peace officer.
Second, he asserts that he could not be
guilty of violating section 76-5-102.4 because it only bars the assaulting of a peace
officer acting within the scope of his or her
authority. He contends that the officer's
entry into the building was illegal and,
therefore, the officer was not acting within
the scope of his authority. Finally, he contends that section 76-2-406 of the Code, a
statute permitting the use of force to defend property, gave him the right to resist
the officer's search of his property. We
disagree with all of Gardiner's contentions
and uphold his convictions.
We recite the facts in a light most favorable to the State, the prevailing party below. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117
(Utah 1989); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d
530, 531 (Utah 1979); Paull v. Zions First
Xat'l Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 184, 417 P.2d
"59, 760 (1966).
During the early morning hours of-April
17, 1988, the Uintah County Sheriffs Department received an anonymous complaint

that a loud party was in progress at the
Vernal City Airport and that minors were
consuming alcohol at that party. At approximately 3 a.m., Deputy Jim Lytle was
dispatched to the airport to investigate the
complaint. Vernal City Officer Steve Hatzidakis and Reserve Officer Terry Shiner
responded to assist Deputy Lytle in his
investigation.
The officers located a party at the Dinaland Aviation building. While Officer Hatzidakis was talking to individuals in a vehicle near the building, he noticed that
someone was attempting to close a sliding
door on the building. Officer Hatzidakis
went to the doorway. There, he smelled a
strong odor of alcohol and saw several
people within the building whom he believed to be minors. He announced his
intention to enter the building to check for
the presence of minors.
At that point, defendant Chad Gardiner,
who was in the building, stepped forward
and stated that his father owned the building. Gardiner asked the officer for a
search warrant. Upon being told that the
officer had no warrant, Gardiner said that
Officer Hatzidakis could not enter, stepped
within eight to ten inches of the officer at
the doorway, and extended his arm, to the
side to block the door and prevent the
officer from entering. Officer Hatzidakis
pushed Gardiner, who then fell backward
onto a table, which collapsed under him.
Gardiner got up, rushed toward Officer
Hatzidakis, and punched him in the face.
The blow knocked the officer out of the
building. Outside the building, a struggle
ensued between Gardiner and the three
officers. After being informed by Officer
Hatzidakis that he was under arrest, Gardiner did not stop fighting but again
punched the officer in the face. Gardiner
was ultimately subdued and taken to jail.
Gardiner was charged with two counts of
assaulting a peace officer, one count of
interfering with a peace officer, and one
count of intoxication in a private place.
The case was heard without a jury by
Judge A. Lynn Payne of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Uintah County. Judge Payne
found Gardiner guilty of one count of as-
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saulting a peace officer and one count of
interfering with a peace officer. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102.4. 76-8-305 (1990).
Gardiner was fined S500 and given a oneyear suspended sentence.
Gardiner appealed his convictions. In an
unpublished opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the search by Officer Hatzidakis was illegal because there were no
exigent circumstances that justified a warrantless search. However, the court went
on to say that the legality of the search
was not the pivotal issue. Rather, the deciding issue was whether a citizen has the
right to forcibly resist a peaceful search by
an officer when that search is at some later
date determined to be illegal. The court
followed a decision from Alaska, Elson v.
State, 659 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983), and
declined to recognize the English common
law rule that a citizen does have such a
right. Instead, the court of appeals held
that one may not resist a search by an
officer, even if illegal, * 'unless [the] defendant can show that the officer was not . . .
acting pursuant to his [or her] authority, or
had used excessive force." State v. Gardiner, No. 880557 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Because defendant had not carried his burden
on these issues, the court affirmed his conviction for assaulting a peace officer.
[1] Gardiner then petitioned for a rehearing, arguing that the court of appeals'
holding was in conflict with this court's
decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800
(Utah 1975). In Bradshaw, this court held
1. We note with some concern the court of appeals' use of rule 31 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to dispose of this case via an
unpublished opinion, even after Bradshaw was
called to its attention. Rule 31 allows an appellate court to "dispose of any qualified case" in
an unpublished opinion upon its own motion.
However, by its own terms, the rule is not
appropriate for use where there are "substantial
constitutional issues, issues of significant public
interest, issues of law of first impression, or
complicated issues of fact or law." Utah
R.App.P. 31.
Here, the initial court of appeals' opinion* established a new rule of Utah law, as the opinion
itself acknowledged; yet that opinion was unpublished. Then the court of appeals denied
Gardiner's petition for rehearing, which brought
to the court's attention dicta in Bradshaw that
appeared to be flatly contrary to the new rule

that a Utah statute making it unlawful f0
a citizen to forcibly resist an illegal arrest
was written so as to make it unconstitutionally vague. Bradshaw went on to sav
in dicta that if the legislature, in passing
the statute in question, had intended to
punish a citizen who refused to "willingly
submit to an unlawful arrest," then the
statute would also violate both the state
and federal constitutions. Id. at 801. This
dicta, claimed Gardiner, plainly recognized
the English common law right to resist an
unlawful arrest; indeed, it constitutionalized it. Because an illegal search is directly analogous to an illegal arrest, Gardiner
argued, Bradshaw governed the present
case and the court of appeals' holding was
in direct conflict with Bradshaw. The
court of appeals denied Gardiner's petition
without comment.1 This court then granted Gardiner's writ of certiorari.
In passing on Gardiner's claims, we first
note that the court of appeals affirmed his
conviction for assaulting a peace officer
under section 76-5-102.4 of the Code, but
did not mention his conviction for interfering with a peace officer under section 768-305 of the Code. Our review of Gardiner's brief in the court of appeals makes it
clear that he appealed from both convictions and that his challenges to both were
virtually identical. Therefore, we presume
that the court of appeals intended its ruling
to apply to both convictions. We will address both convictions in our opinion.
announced in the unpublished opinion; yet the
opinion remained unpublished. In sum, this
case rather plainly was not one that could be
properly disposed of under rule 31.
The evils of unpublished opinions have been
commented upon by many. Given the paucity
of precedent in Utah, there seems little justification for their use here. "[I]f a case deserves
being disposed of by written opinion, that opinion should be published. If a decision truly
adds nothing to the law, it should be disposed of
from the bench or by a short written order that
may be informative to the parties but to no one
else." Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah
*1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). For a discussion of the potential problems associated
with unpublished opinions see Reuben, Published in Part, Buried in Part, 16 Li tig. 4 (Summer
1990), and Raffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 104
(Utah 1986).
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[2] We also note our acceptance of the
court of appeals' conclusion that Officer
Hatzidakis's search of the building was ilVo-al This court has held that absent one
of a narrow category of exigent circumstances, warrantless searches are "per se
unreasonable under the fourth amendment." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258
(Utah 1987); see also State v. Christensen,
676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). That principle has as much, if not more, force under
the Utah Constitution. See State v. Larocc0, 794 P.2d 460, 466-68 (Utah 1990).
Therefore, this case squarely presents the
question of whether Gardiner had a common law or statutory right to resist what
was later determined to be an illegal
search. Gardiner makes three separate arguments attacking his convictions, but all
are really variations on a theme.
[3] Gardiner's first contention is that
our decision in Bradshaw adopted the English common law rule that a person can
forcibly resist an unlawful arrest and,
therefore, that he had the right to forcibly
resist Officer Hatzidakis's search of Dinaland Aviation. Response to this argument
requires a rather detailed discussion of
Bradshaw.
The defendant in Bradshaw was charged
with resisting arrest in violation of what
was then section 76-8-305 of the Code.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp.
1973). That statute read: "A person is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor when he
[or she] intentionally interferes with a person recognized to be a law enforcement
official seeking to effect an arrest or detention of himself [or herself] or another regardless of whether there is a legal basis
for the arrest." Id. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute,
claiming that it violated the search and
seizure clause of the Utah Constitution.
See Utah Const, art. I, § 14. Although the
opinion is not clear on this point, he apparently claimed that an illegal arrest amounte
d to an unreasonable seizure.
The majority opinion, written by Justice
Tuckett, joined by Justice Maughan, and
separately concurred in by Justice Henriod,
aid not dispose of the case on the defen-

dant's contention, but instead struck the
statute down as invalid on vagueness
grounds. The court reasoned that terms
such as "regardless of whether there is a
legal basis for the arrest" and "interferes"
could have a number of meanings and interpretations. On that basis, this court
concluded that the statute "fail[ed] to inform an ordinary citizen who is seeking to
obey the laws as to the conduct sought to
be proscribed." Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at
802.
Although the Bradshaw majority did not
decide the case on the basis that a person
had a right, constitutional or otherwise, to
use force to resist an illegal arrest, it did
reach this issue in dictum. Justice Tuckett's opinion stated:
If the intention of the legislature was
to penalize a law-abiding citizen by incarceration because he [or she] did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest, a
statute authorizing the same is in violation of both the Utah and United States
Constitutions . . . in that it permits and
authorizes an arrest without probable
cause and without lawful basis for the
arrest.
Id. at 801. Justice Henriod, in his separate
concurrence, stated that he would have
struck the statute down not only on vagueness grounds, but also on the ground that
the statute violated the state search and
seizure provisions by making unlawful any
resistance to an illegal arrest. Id. at 80305.
The two dissenters wrote separate opinions. Each disagreed with the statement in
the majority opinion that it would be unconstitutional for the legislature to make it
unlawful to resist an illegal arrest. Id. at
805 (Ellett, J., dissenting); id. at 806
(Crockett, J., dissenting). Justice Ellett explained his view of the matter by noting:
The common law gave a person the
right to resist an unlawful arrest, but
times have changed since the time when
self-help was permitted to prevent a
wrongful arrest. At common law, arrests were often made by citizens.
Judges were not available for speedy release on bond, and trials were long de-
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laved. Such conditions no longer exist.
An arrested person must be taken forthwith before a magistrate, and trial must
not be unreasonably delayed. A defendant is entitled to bail in a reasonable
amount.
Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 805. In his view,
these protections mooted the majority's objection to the statute's substance. "[The
statute] does not permit an unlawful seizure (arrest). It merely transfers the right
of redress for a wrongful arrest to the
orderly procedure of a court trial instead of
a brawl in the streets." Id.
Gardiner asserts that the majority in
Bradshaw adopted the common law right
to forcibly resist an illegal search or arrest.
We acknowledge that the language of both
Justice Tuckett's majority opinion and Justice Henriod's concurrence does suggest
not only a common law right to forcibly
resist an illegal arrest and, by extension,
an illegal search, but also a state and federal constitutional right as well. However,
no matter how strongly a majority of the
members of the court which sat on Bradshaw in 1975 felt about this issue, they did
not decide the case on this ground. The
majority's holding of unconstitutionality
was based on vagueness alone. Any discussion of the substantive right to resist is
dictum only, and this court is not bound by
earlier dicta. See State v. Rimmasch, 775
P.2d 388, 400 (Utah 1989). Therefore, the
comments of the majority in Bradshaw on
this issue are not controlling, and this court
has yet to pass upon whether Utah recognizes the availability of a common law right
to forcibly resist an illegal search or arrest
and the scope of that right.
The English common law right to forcibly resist one attempting to effect an illegal arrest was established almost three
hundred years ago in Regina v. Tooley, 2
Ld. Raymond Rep. 1296, 1299-1301 (Q.B.
1709). As Justice Ellett's dissent in Bradshaw noted, the Tooley case was decided at
a time when an illegal arrest posed grave
risks for a defendant. Most arrests were
made by private citizens, not by public officers. Bail for felonies was unattainable,
and years might pass before royal judges
arrived for a jail delivery. Under such

circumstances, there was no speedy or effective way to challenge an illegal arrest
The adoption of the Tooley rule seemed at
that time both reasonable and justifiable
See S. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act,
28 Va.L.Rev. 315, 330 (1942) [hereinafter
"Warner"].
However, this common law right has
been subjected to extensive criticism. See,
e.g., State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz. 142, 147f
568 P.2d 1040, 1045 (1977); People v. Hess,
687 P.2d 443, 447 (Colo. 1984); Wamer at
330-31. The criticism of the self-help doctrine is based on the fact, noted by Justice
Ellett's dissent, that the dangers flowing
from illegal arrests which existed when the
rule was adopted are substantially reduced
today. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 805 (Ellett,
J., dissenting). An arrestee now has the
"benefits of liberal bonding policies, appointed counsel in the case of indigency,
and the opportunity to be taken before a
magistrate for immediate arraignment and
preliminary hearing." State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 450, 511 P.2d 263, 267
(1973).
Similar considerations support a rejection
of the doctrine where illegal searches are
concerned. The Supreme Court of New
Mexico in State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 583
P.2d 464 (1978), summarized the dangers of
the common law self-help rule and its reasons for rejecting that rule where searches
are concerned:
Self-help measures undertaken by a
potential defendant who objects to the
legality of the search can lead to violence
and serious physical injury. The societal
interest in the orderly settlement of disputes between citizens and their government outweighs any individual interest in
resisting a questionable search. One can
reasonably be asked to submit peaceably
and to take recourse in his legal remedies.
Doe, 92 N.M. at 102-03, 583 P.2d at 466-67
(citations omitted). Further, in cases of
illegal police searches, the subject of the
search has "the assurance that any evidence so acquired is rendered inadmissible
in a subsequent criminal trial." United
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Suites ex re I. Kilheffer v. Plowfield, 409
F.SupP- 677, 680-81 (E.D.Pa.l9T6); see also
S::zie\\ Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 471 (Utah
1990). This was most certainly not the
case at common law.
Because the justification for the common
law doctrine has all but disappeared, and
because of its potential for causing violent
confrontations between police, who are
usually armed, and private citizens, the
modern trend is to reject the common law
risrht.2 Thus, in most states a citizen may
no: use force to resist an illegal arrest
unless the officer uses excessive force.
Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596,
600, 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (1983).3
For like reasons, some courts have extended this rejection of the common law
right to resist an illegal arrest to illegal
searches as well, including the Supreme
Court of Alaska in the decision relied upon
by zhe court of appeals, Elson v. State, 659
P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983). In that case, the
defendant had been pulled over for suspicion of drunk driving. As the officer performed a "pat down," he noticed a hard
object in the defendant's right pants pocket. The officer then attempted to remove
the object, and the defendant resisted. Before the Alaska Supreme Court, the defendant argued that he had a constitutional
right to forcibly resist what he believed to
be an illegal search. The court disagreed
and held, "[A] private citizen may not use
force to resist a peaceful search by one
who he knows or has good reason to be2. In the following cases, courts have rejected the
common law rule: Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421,
427 (Alaska 1969); State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz.
142, 147-48, 568 P.2d 1040, 1045-46 (1977);
Stats v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 451, 511 P.2d
263, 268 (1973); State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d
607, 610-11 (Iowa 1978); State v. Austin, 381
A.2d 652, 655 (Me.1978); In re Welfare of Burns,
284 N.W.2d 359, 360 (Minn. 1979); State v.
Nunes, 546 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (Mo.Ct.App.
1977); State v. Koonce, 89 NJ.Super. 169, 18384, 214 A.2d 428, 435-36 (1965); State v. Doe, 92
N.M. 100, 102-03, 583 P.2d 464, 467 (1978);
Columbus v. Fraley, 41 Ohio St.2d 173, 179-80,
324 N.E.2d 735 (1975).
3. In Moreira, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts conducted an in-depth analysis of
this issue. Through its research, it concluded
that at that time eleven states by judicial deci-

lieve is an authorized police officer performing his duties, regardless of whether
the search is ultimately determined to be
illegal." Id. at 1200.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico had
previously come to the same conclusion and
adopted a rule similar to that in Elson.
Doe, 92 N.M. at 102-03, 583 P.2d at 467;
see also United States v. Ferrone, 438
F.2d 381, 390 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 402
U.S. 1008, 91 S.Ct. 2188, 29 L.Ed.2d 430
(1971) (a person cannot forcibly resist a
peace officer's execution of a search warrant later found to be illegal); Hatton, 116
Ariz, at 148, 568 P.2d at 1046.
[4] Based on the foregoing discussion
and the trend in other states, were we free
to do so, we would be inclined to reject the
English common law and adopt the diluted
defense to an illegal search or arrest articulated in Elson and similar decisions.4
However, we conclude that we are not free
to fashion such a rule because the legislature has already acted in the area. Common law rights to resist arrest are not
relevant where the common law has been
replaced by statute.
When the Utah legislature enacted the
Utah criminal code in 1973, it abolished all
common law crimes. Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-105 (1973). Now, in Utah a person
is guilty of a crime only if that person's
actions and state of mind fit within the
statutory definitional elements of a crime.
E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105; State v.
sion and nineteen states by legislative enactment had determined that "a person may not
resist an unlawful arrest which is accomplished
without excessive force." Moreira, 388 Mass. at
600, 447 N.E.2d at 1228.
-. The Alaska Supreme Court addressed an additional issue in Elson. A footnote in that decision warned that the rule it adopted barring the
use of force to oppose a search does not apply
where the officer uses "excessive or unnecessary
force in conducting the search." Elson, 659
P.2d at 1200 n. 18. This qualification resulted
from the court's concern that in instances where
the officer uses excessive force in effecting a
search, the defendant must have the legal right
to defend against that excessive force. See Gray
v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 908 (Alaska 1970). Were
we to adopt the approach, we would incorporate
this view into our test.
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Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1982).
State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406., 408 n. 4
(Utah 1984). Similarly, the legislature enacted a number of general defenses as well
as numerous specific defenses which are
included in the various statutory provisions. However, in codifying these defenses, it did not enact a generally available
defense based on the illegality of police
conduct. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-401
to -406 (codifying defenses for minority,
compulsion, entrapment, ignorance of fact
which negates specific mental state, and
mental illness). We consider the enactment of these specific and varied defenses
and the failure to enact any general illegality defense to impliedly preclude us from
finding any generally available common
law right to resist an illegal search or
arrest. If such a defense exists in Utah, it
must be grounded in the specific code sections under which Gardiner was convicted.
[5] The first crime of which he was
convicted is assault on a peace officer, a
crime under section 76-5-102.4 of the Code.
Section 76-5-102.4 provides:
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he [or she] is a
peace officer, and when the peace officer
is acting within the scope of his [or her]
authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1990). The
only language in this section that could be
construed as giving any sanction to a right
to resist an unlawful arrest is the phrase
"and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his [or her] authority as a
peace officer." However, this is not equivalent to the common law defense. Under
section 76-5-102.4, the State must show, as
an element of proof of the offense, that the
officer was "acting within the scope of his
[or her] authority as a peace officer." The
defendant has no burden of proof on the
issue, as was the case at common law and
as would be true even under the modern
trend.
On the other hand, the statute does not
require that the State prove that the precise act the officer is performing is not
legally challengeable, i.e., that the arrest or

search being effected is entirely lawful and
beyond challenge. All that must be shown
is that the officer is acting within the
"scope of authority of a peace officer." In
this respect, section 76-5-102.4 would appear from its plain language to reject the
narrow common law approach endorsed in
Bradshaw that authorized resistance if the
arrest was unlawful in any particular and
instead to have opted for an approach that,
in operation, will be closer to the modem
trend. Where the officer is not acting
wholly outside the scope of his or her authority, the police action may not be resisted. The fine question of legality must be
determined in subsequent judicial proceedings, not in the street. In interpreting the
language "scope of authority," we find illustrative the Second Circuit's decision in
United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241,
245 (2d Cir.1967). There, it stated that the
test is whether an officer is doing what he
or she was employed to do or is "engaging
in a personal frolic of his [or her] own."
Id.
Gardiner and Judge Bench argue that
Gardiner should be acquitted because Hatzidakis was not acting within the scope of
his authority when he conducted what was
later determined to be an unlawful search.
However, this position ignores the language of the statute in an attempt to reach
a result the Bradshaw dictum would sanction.
[6] Having isolated the legal standard,
we must determine whether it was met
here. We note that in cases involving
mixed questions of fact and law where the
judge makes a determination on contested
facts, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court's ruling
and reverse only if the necessary factual
findings implicit in the court's ruling lack
sufficient evidentiary support. See Grayson-Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson,
782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987);
Utah R. Civ.P. 52(a). In reviewing the
application of the law to those facts and
findings, we apply a correctness standard
and reverse if the legal standard is not
satisfied. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v.
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SaU Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887
,Y>.ah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700
p.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985): Margulies v.
Cpchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985).
Viewed in a light most favorable to the
trial court, the facts are that Officer Hatzidakis responded to an anonymous phone
call reporting a loud party at the Vernal
Airport. He was in uniform and on duty at
the time he responded to the call. Upon
arrival at the scene, he informed Gardiner
and others that he was a police officer and
intended to search the building because he
saw persons he believed to be minors consuming alcohol inside. When Hatzidakis
informed Gardiner that he did not have a
search warrant, Gardiner told the officer
he could not enter and physically confronted the officer. The trial court found that
Gardiner's ''demeanor . . . was hostile and
threatening." At this point, Hatzidakis
pushed Gardiner away from the door, and
Gardiner fell onto a card table that crashed
under his weight. We find these factual
findings to have adequate evidentiary support in the record. Considering the circumstances Officer Hatzidakis faced at this
point, we conclude that the trial court did
not err in finding that the force used as a
matter of law to pursue the search was
"not excessive" and was "reasonable in
view of the circumstances." Gardiner then
got up from the ground, charged Hatzidakis, and hit him in the face, knocking him
out of the building. The melee continued
outside the building, even after Hatzidakis
informed Gardiner he was under arrest.
From these facts, it is clear that there is
sufficient evidence to find that Gardiner
was guilty of assaulting a peace officer
under section 76-5-102.4 while that officer
was attempting to conduct a search in the
course of a criminal investigation and then
effect an arrest.
Was the officer "acting within the scope
of his authority as a peace officer"? We
think the evidence is ample to support the
trial court's conclusion that he was. The
fact that his attempted search was later
found to be unlawful does not divest him of
his authority. See United HeTiczer, 373
F.2d at 245.
814P.2d— U
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[7] Turning to the second count for
which Gardiner was convicted, section 768-305 provides:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he [or she] has knowledge, or
by the exercise of reasonable care,
should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or
detention of himself [or herself] or another and interferes with such arrest or
detention by use of force or by use of
any weapon.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp.1990).
Without recounting the events that precipitated the brawl, it is clear that when Gardiner hit the officer the first time, he had
violated section 76-5-102.4. It was after
this punch and during the ensuing fight
outside the building that Hatzidakis informed Gardiner that he was under arrest.
The record is clear that Gardiner was
aware of Hatzidakis's attempt to place him
under arrest. In fact, after Hatzidakis informed him that he was under arrest,
Gardiner contended that he was not and
then proceeded to hit Hatzidakis again in
the face. This evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction under section 76-8305. Gardiner points to the illegality of the
underlying search as justification for his
attacking and continuing to. fight Hatzidakis. However, as noted above, this is not a
sufficient ground to assault a peace officer.
[8] Gardiner relies also on sections 762-405 and -406 as articulating a right to
physically resist Hatzidakis's search. Section 76-2-405 gives a person the right to
use reasonable force to "prevent" or "terminate" another's unlawful entry or attack
upon his [or her] "habitation." That section states: "A person is justified in using
force against another when and to the extent that he [or she] reasonably believes
that the force is necessary to prevent or
terminate the other's unlawful entry into
or attack upon his [or her] habitation
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 (1990) (emphasis added). Because no place of habitation
is involved here, only a place of business,
by its terms section 76-2-405 has no application to our case.
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[9] As for section 76-2-406, it provides:
"A person is justified in using force, other
than dead// force, against another when
and to the extent that he [or she] reasonably believes that force is necessary to
prevent or terminate criminal interference
with real property or personal property."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 (1990). This
section does permit the use of force to
prevent a criminal interference with real
property, and it could be construed to cover
an illegal search of commercial premises.
However, section 76-2-406 does not explicitly mention peace officers. For reasons
common to sections 76-2-405 and -406, we
conclude that that legislative silence indicates an intention that the actions of law
enforcement officers taken within the
course of their duties are not within the
category of intrusions that may be lawfully
resisted.
Both section 76-2-405 and section 76-2406 were enacted in 1973 when the version
of section 76-8-305 struck down by Bradshaw was still in force. That section made
it illegal to resist arrest or detainment by a
peace officer without regard to its legality.
Thus, interpreting section 76-2-406 to include within its scope peace officers acting
in the furtherance of their duty would
bring section 76-2-406 into direct conflict
with then-section 76-8-305. We conclude
that the legislature intended section 76-2406 and section 76-2-405 to exclude peace
officers acting in the course of their duties
from their operation.
The judgment is affirmed.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.
STEWART, Justice (dissenting).
I join in Judge Bench's dissent and add
the following comments. The majority
opinion allows the State to charge a citizen
who is physically attacked by a police officer for resisting an unlawful and unconstitutional act with the crimes of interfering
with a police officer and assault on a police
officer. Although the defendant fought
back after the officer's initial attack, it is
perfectly clear that the officer initiated the
violence and then arrested the defendant
for fighting back. The shocking conse-

quence of the Court's ruling is that an
officer seeking to conduct an unconstitutional search may physically attack a citizen and then charge that citizen with a
crime for defending himself. The majority's holding that the police officer's conduct was within his "scope of authority" [3
plainly startling. To reach such an eccentric result, the Court ignores legislative
intent expressed in an amendment to the
assault statute, opts to follow what it says
is the trend of cases, and simply ignores
the constitutional right that the defendant
was entitled to rely on.
The incident in this case was precipitated
when a Vernal City police officer undertook
a concededly unconstitutional search which
the defendant resisted by placing his arm
in a position to bar the doorway when he
found the officer had no warrant. The
officer then shoved the defendant backward with such force that he was thrown a
distance of eight feet against a table that
collapsed.
Gardiner was charged with and convicted
of assault against a peace officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1990)
and interfering with a peace officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305
(1990). The bulk of the majority opinion is
addressed to the question of whether a
citizen has a common law defense of selfdefense to unlawful action by a police officer. The majority does not give any
weight to the fact that the officer initiated
the violence. The majority and the trial
courts try to tiptoe around the issue on the
trial court's finding that the defendant initiated the violence because the defendant's
"demeanor" was "hostile." Apparently citizens must be either meek when their
rights are violated or suffer police-initiated
violence. It is, of course, clear that if that
conviction fails, the other conviction must
also fail because the arrest would be unlawful, as Judge Bench states.
The key issue in this case, as Judge
Bench points out, is whether the State
proved the elements of the crime of assault
on a police officer. The majority pays
scant attention to the issue and deals with
it in a" most conclusory fashion. The iegis-
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ladve history of the assault statute gives
guidance in construing that provision. A
1987 amendment to that statute indicates a
legislative intent to make an assault on an
officer a crime only when the officer is
acting within his or her authority. It is not
enough to show that an officer was on duty
and performing his duties. Prior to the
19ST amendment, the assault statute read:
Any person who assaults a peace officer,
with knowledge that he is on duty, is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1978) (emphasis added). The amendment made clear
that being "on duty" was not sufficient.
The amended statute now reads:
Any person who assaults a peace officer,
with knowledge that he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting
within the scope of his authority as a
peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1990) (emphasis added). Now, to constitute a crime,
an assault must be directed against an
officer who is acting "within the scope of
his authority."

is undisputed Chat the officer initiated the
first use of force and that force was clearly
excessive.
The Fourth Amendment gives a citizen a
right to refuse to consent to an entry and
search. The assertion of that right cannot
be a crime.1 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2050, 36
L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-33, 87 S.Ct. 1727,
1731-33, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); United
States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th
Cir.1978); City of Middle burg Heights v.
Theiss, 28 Ohio App.3d 1, 4, 501 N.E.2d
1226, 1229 (1985). See generally 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.13(b) (2d ed.
1987). Despite that law, the majority holds
that the officer acted within the scope of
his authority because he "responded to an
anonymous phone call" to investigate a
"loud party" and was "in uniform and on
duty at the time he responded to the call."
That is tantamount to saying that virtually
anything an officer does is within his authority.

After Officer Hatzidakis announced his
intention to enter the hangar to check for
minors, Gardiner, who was in the building,
told the officer his name and that his father owned the building. Gardiner asked
Hatzidakis if he had a warrant, and the
officer replied that he did not. Gardiner
then told Hatzidakis he could not enter the
building and stepped forward and extended
his arm to block Hatzidakis's entry. No
physical contact occurred between Gardiner and the officer when Gardiner blocked
the doorway. At this point, the officer
shoved Gardiner. The trial court found
that Hatzidakis "perceived" Gardiner's action in blocking the doorway to be threatening and on that basis found that the officer's use of force was reasonable and not
excessive. That finding is wrong; the fact

The better-reasoned cases reject that approach. The Idaho Court of Appeals, in
State v. Wilkersont 114 Idaho 174, 180, 755
P.2d 471, 477 (Idaho Ct.App.), affd, 115
Idaho 357, 766 P.2d 1238 (1988), construed
a statute which used the phrase "duty of
his office" and stated that the phrase includes "only those lawful and authorized
acts of a public officer. To hold otherwise
would clothe an officer with protection
from resistance based only on his status as
an officer and would render the [balance of
the statute] mere surplusage." An illegal
search by an officer cannot be within the
officer's scope of authority. People v.
Swiercz, 104 Ill.App.3d 733, 737, 60 Ill.Dec.
1, 2, 432 N.E.2d 900, 902 (1982), held that
an officer's entry into an apartment without a warrant and without exigent circumstances to search for a suspect was not an
"authorized act" which was required to

1. Gardiner's actions were in response to an illegal search, but many of the cases deal with an
unlawful arrest. An illegal search may be as
invasive as an unlawful arrest. See, e.g., People
v. Wetzel, 11 Cai.3d 104, 113 Cal.Rptr. 32, 520
P.2d 416 (1974); State v. Gallagher, 191 Conn.
433, 465 A.2d 323 (1983). See generally 1 W.

LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.13 (2d ed. 1987).
Furthermore, a person cannot be convicted of a
crime for failing to obey a police officer's order
if that order is violative of the United States
Constitution. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284,
291-92, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 1245, 10 L.Ed.2d 349
(1963).

578

Utah

814 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

support a conviction for obstructing a police officer.
In State v. Hauan, 361
N.W.2d 336, 339-40 (Iowa Ct.App.1984), the
court ruled that an officer who exceeded
the scope of a search warrant was not
engaged in his ''official duties" and, therefore, the defendant was not guilty of interference with official acts. In my view, the
officer's use of force in executing an illegal
search in this case was not within the scope
of his authority. Even if the law were
otherwise, it is beyond question that an
officer who physically attacks a citizen for
refusing to consent to an illegal search is
patently beyond his authority.
The majority asserts the position, also
expressed in Justice Ellett's dissent in
State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, 805-06
(Utah 1975), that procedural safeguards
are sufficient to protect the rights of those
who are unlawfully arrested. In my view,
that position is unrealistic. One author has
observed that "such protections are realizable only if the defendant has some reliable
way of showing that the police acted unconstitutionally." Chevigny, The Right to
Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 Yale L.J.
1128, 1134-35 (1969). The remedies the
majority relies on to justify denying a citizen the right to resist unlawful conduct are
of little value. A citizen who must endure
a stay in jail and the expense of posting
bail and obtaining an attorney is simply
doubly wronged. Empirical studies show
that administrative review of police abuse
is ineffectual as a remedy for police misconduct; civil damages are inadequate because an "action may take several years,
and the plaintiff may have a difficult time
finding a lawyer willing to spend the necessary time on his case unless he has been
injured badly enough to give rise to large
damages." Id. at 1135-36.
The majority opinion abolishes the right
of a citizen to use reasonable force to resist
an unlawful act by a police officer and
holds that the criminal code does not provide for a defense of reasonable resistance
to unlawful police conduct. This construction of the criminal code is erroneous. The
majority states that "the enactment of . . .
specific and varied defenses and the failure
to enact any general illegality defense . . .

impliedly preclude[s] us from finding anv
generally available common law right to
resist... .*' In essence, the majority concludes that only statutorily defined defenses are available in Utah. The code does
not purport to state the only allowable defenses. For example, in State v. Sessions,
645 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982), we recognized a
defense not then found in the code, although that defense is now contained in the
code. Furthermore, everyday practice and
common sense disprove the majority's casual assertion that only statutory defenses
are recognized in Utah. For example, former jeopardy is a constitutional defense not
mentioned in that part of the code dealing
with affirmative defenses. Beyond doubt,
that defense is, and must be, recognized in
Utah.
The majority's position is unsupported by
any authority from a state which has
adopted the Model Penal Code and is simply incorrect. The current criminal code
was adopted from the Model Penal Code.
The commentaries to the Model Penal Code
state:
The status of common law defenses
. . . is not entirely clear. Of the jurisdictions that have enacted or proposed revised penal codes since promulgation of
the Model Penal Code, six have specifically .retained common law defenses.
Five of these are jurisdictions that have
abolished or would abolish common law
offenses; one jurisdiction, Florida, has
explicit provisions retaining both common law offenses and common law defenses
Only the proposed code of
Maryland specifically abolishes common
law defenses.
Even some of those enacted and proposed codes that explicitly state that defenses shall be governed by their provisions may not be entirely clear with respect to common law defenses. While
such provisions would appear to be limiting defenses to those provided by the
code, two that state that the code "shall
govern . . . the construction and application of any defense . . . , " specifically retain common law defenses.
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Model Penal Code § 1.05 comment 5, at
S2-S3 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (footnotes omitted). The comment notes that although adoption of the
Model Penal Code "should render common
law defenses unnecessary," the issue is
dependent on the nuances of the code in
each jurisdiction, and the "significance of
common law defenses would be greater" in
some jurisdictions. Id. at 83 & n. 53.
I submit that a citizen should have the
right to resist, in a reasonable manner, acts
that are clearly unlawful. Although fine
points of law ought not to be a spark for
violent confrontations, the law ought to
favor the citizen against clearly unconstitutional conduct, most especially when an
officer initiates violence and uses excessive
force. "The purpose of the right is not to
encourage violent attacks on policemen,
but to preserve the sense of personal liberty inherent in the right to reject arbitrary
orders." Chevigny, The Right to Resist an
Unlawful Arrest, 78 Yale L.J. 1128, 1150
(1969).
BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge
(dissenting).
When all is said and done, the majority
recognizes that this is a case of statutory
construction. I dissent because I disagree
with the majority's construction of the statutes Gardiner was accused of violating.
In construing a statute, the primary focus should be on the. statutory text, the
words employed by the Legislature to express its intent, because "the best indication of legislative intent is the statute's
plain language." Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989).
Thus, "[wjhere statutory language is plain
and unambiguous, this Court will not look
beyond to divine legislative intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a
statute should be construed according to its
plain language." Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah
1. Gardiner argues that the search in this case
was unlawful. The State does not refute that
argument, and the majority notes "its acceptance of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
Officer Hatzidakis's search of the building was

1988); see also Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779
P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 19897.
However, rather than taking the statutory text as its starting point, the majority
begins by dusting off what it admits is an
obsolete common law defense in order to
kill an already dead letter, noting along the
way the evils of self-help. Whatever those
evils may be, they are not the point. The
real issue in this case is whether the Legislature intended Gardiner's conduct to be a
criminal offense. The majority roams far
afield from what the Legislature clearly
said, perhaps because the Legislature quite
plainly intended a result different from
that which the majority strains to accomplish.
SECTION 76-5-102.4
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1990) escalates the penalty for assault, ordinarily a
class B misdemeanor, to a class A misdemeanor when the defendant has "assaulted] a peace officer, with knowledge
that he is a peace officer, and when the
peace officer is acting within the scope of
his authority as a peace officer." By the
plain meaning of these words, the Legislature did not intend them to encompass a
peace officer performing clearly illegal activity, such as the illegal search and the
unnecessary use of force in this case.1
However, the majority concludes that an
illegal search is within the scope of a peace
officer's authority. Cf. State ex rel. Hurley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972). It
seems highly implausible that the Legislature considered peace officers to have authority to do illegal acts.
I also do not believe that the Legislature
intended to subvert the fourth amendment
by including within the "scope of [a peace
officers] authority" the power to perform
clearly unreasonable searches. The right
"to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches" means more than simply the
right to exclude at trial illegally obtained
illegal." Accepting the facts as stated by the
majority, it seems strikingly obvious that the
search in this case violated the fourth amendment.
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evidence. The fourth amendment was intended as a limitation on governmental
power.2 The exclusion of evidence is merely one of the means for effecting that
limitation. See Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652
(1914). By concluding that performing a
clearly illegal search was within the scope
of Officer Hatzidakis's authority, the majority severely undermines the right to be
secure from unreasonable searches. Instead of undermining the Constitution, the
majority should follow the statute's plain
meaning, which is in harmony with the
Constitution. See Chris & Dick's Lumber
& Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511,
516 (Utah 1990).
The only support the majority offers in
explaining away the scope-of-authority
wording of section 76-5-102.4 is United
States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d
Cir.1967), which upheld the conviction of a
bystander who resisted an arrest that the
jury found to be lawful as a citizen's arrest
under New York law. Heliczer's dicta
criticizing the common law right to resist
an unlawful arrest within the scope of a
peace officer's authority are an extremely
weak basis for explaining away the plain
meaning of the Utah statute increasing the
penalty for assault only if the victim is "a
peace officer acting within the scope of his
authority." Obiter remarks from another
jurisdiction in another factual context are
no basis to interpret "[unambiguous language in [a] statute . . . so as to contradict
its plain meaning." Bonham v. Morgan,
788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1990); Johnson v.
Utah State Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d 93,
95 (Utah 1988).
Thus, the majority contradicts the plain
meaning of the Utah statute by including
within the "scope of [a peace officer's]
authority" the power to conduct illegal
searches in violation of the fourth amendment.
2. Drawing from their experience under British
colonial rule, the framers sought to ensure that
general warrants and writs of assistance would
have no place in the new government. See
State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 740-42 (Utah Ct.
App.1991) (explaining development of the exclu-

SECTION 76-8-305
Gardiner was also convicted of interfering with a lawful arrest in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1990), which provides:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge or by the
exercise of reasonable care, should have
knowledge that a peace officer is seeking
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of
himself or another and interferes with
such arrest or detention by use of force
or by use of any weapon.
The State recognizes that the principal
difficulty in applying this section to Gardiner is the phrase requiring "knowledge
that a peace officer is seeking to effect a
lawful arrest or detention of [the defendant] or another." Gardiner argues that
his arrest was not lawful, and the State
essentially conceded that point in oral argument and asked us to avoid considering the
lawfulness of the arrest. Nevertheless,
the majority proceeds to affirm Gardiner's
conviction under this section without ever
confronting the question whether Gardiner
knew that Officer Hatzidakis was "seeking
to effect a lawful arrest." Gardiner's position has been that the arrest was not lawful; in his mind, he was resisting an unlawful arrest, an act which section 76-8305 does not penalize. Since the State concedes this point, it has not established a
violation of section 76-8-305, and Gardiner's conviction under that section should
be reversed. See Hurley. 28 Utah 2d 248.
501 P.2d 111 (reversing a conviction for
interfering with an arrest by an officer
exceeding the duties of his office).
CONCLUSION
I would hold that the officer was not
acting "within the scope of his authority"
for purposes of section 76-5-102.4 and
would accordingly reverse Gardiner's conviction under that section. I would also
sionary rule); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v.
Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure Cases, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1365, 1369
(1983).

MORTON INTERN., INC. v. AUDITING DIV.

Utah

581

Cite as 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991)

reverse his conviction under section 76-8305 because, as the State concedes, Gardner was not knowingly interfering with a
•^ace officer "seeking to effect a lawful
arrest." Since the State fails to establish a
orima facie case under either statute, I see
no need to consider defenses that could
applyFinally, and with hindsight, I agree with
the majority's comment that the Court of
Appeals should have published its opinion
in this case. In my view, publication of
appellate opinions serves essentially two
important purposes: It records and disseminates the development of the common
law,3 and it enables the public to monitor
the quality of appellate judicial service.4
However, some cases coming before a
court hearing appeals as of right do not
present issues that could enhance the development of the common law, and publication of the greater part of an Appellate
Court's decisions provides an adequate
sampling of Judicial performance. If a
particular case has negligible value as
precedent, the parties are better served by
dispensing with publication and the greater
delay it necessitates.
HOWE, Associate C.J., does not
participate herein.
BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.
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MORTON INTERNATIONAL,
INC., Petitioner,
v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF the UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.
No. 900325.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 24, 1991.
Taxpayer* sought review of determination of Tax Commission that expenditures
3- M. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law
4-5 (1988).

made in construction of facilities used in
production of sodium azide pellets and igniter material were not exempt from sales
and use tax. The Supreme Court, Hall,
C.J., held that: (1) materials used in construction of production facilities did not
qualify for exemption from sales and use
tax, and (2) shells of production facilities
were not "equipment" exempt from sales
and use tax.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in the result.

1. Administrative Law and Procedure
<e=>764
Same standard used for determining
harmfulness of error in appeals from judicial proceedings applies to review of agency action and under that standard, error
will be harmless if it is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that error affected outcome of proceedings. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4).
2. Administrative Law and Procedure
0=781
It is not characterization of issue as
mixed question of fact and law or characterization of issue as question of general
law that is dispositive of determination of
appropriate level of judicial review of agency action; rather, dispositive factor is
whether agency, by virtue of its experience
or expertise, is in a better position than
courts to give effect to regulatory objective
to be achieved.
3. Statutes €=219(2)
When legislative intent concerning specific question at issue can be derived
through traditional methods of statutory
construction, agency's interpretation will
be granted no deference and statute will be
interpreted in accord with its legislative
intent. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d).
4. Statutes <3=>219(1)
Agency's statutory construction should
only be given deference when there is
4.

K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 81 (rev. ed.
1950).
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Richard Allen BRADSHAW, Defendant
and Appellant.

No. 14060.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 16, 1975.

Defendant was convicted in the Fifth
District Court, Beaver County, J. Harlan
Burns, J., of intentionally interfering with
a law enforcement official seeking to effect an arrest, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that the statute under which defendant was convicted
was unconstitutionally vague.
Reversed and remanded for dismissal.
Henriod, C. J., filed a concurring opinion.
Ellett and Crockett, JJ., dissented and
filed separate opinions.

Criminal Law <§=»I3.I(2)

Statute making any person guilty of
a misdemeanor when he "intentionally interferes with a * * * law enforcement
official seeking to effect an arrest or detention of himself * * * regardless of
whether there is a legal basis for the arrest'' may be subject to various meanings
and interpretations, fails to inform ordinary citizen who is seeking to obey the
laws as to conduct sought to be proscribed,
and therefore is unconstitutional as permitting arrest without probable cause and
without lawful basis. U.C.A.1953, 76-8305; Const, art. 1, § 14; U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 4.

Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for defendant-appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F.
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
John O. Christiansen, Beaver County
Atty., Beaver, for plaintiff-respondent.

After a trial de novo in the district coun
defendant was found guilty oi viola:--.
Sec. 76-8-305, U.C.A.1953, as amended.
which reads as follows:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor when he intentionally interferes
with a person recognized to be a law enforcement official seeking to effect a»
arrest or detention of himself or another'
regardless of whether there is a legal
basis for the arrest.
The defendant was sentenced to serve six
months in the county jail. From the verdict and sentence the defendant has appealed claiming that the statute above referred to is invalid on constitutional
grounds.
The complainant is a policeman of Milford City, Beaver County, Utah, who observed the defendant driving an automobile '
on the streets of that city. The officer followed the defendant to a service station
where he informed the defendant that he
was going to issue the defendant a citation
for driving while his driver's license was
suspended. After the defendant had completed the purchase of gasoline he drove
away from the service station a short distance to a hotel where he resided. The officer followed the defendant in a patrol
car with the siren going. At the hotel, the
officer informed the defendant that he was
under arrest for resisting arrest, at which
time the officer pulled his revolver from
the holster. The defendant tapped the officer on the chest and told the officer that
he did not have the "guts" to shoot, whereupon he left the scene and entered the
hotel. At the service station where the officer first accosted the defendant, the officer did not ask the defendant to produce
a driver's license. The accusation that the
defendant was operating an automobile during suspension was untrue, and the defendant "did in fact have a valid driver's license.
It is doubtful whether or not the record
supports the conviction of the defendant
inasmuch as the officer made no effort
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. 0 ::«.ke custody of the defendant, and it is
:
oubctLiI whether or not the act of the defendant in simply ignoring the officer is
On appeal we
a n interference with him.
jre only concerned, however, with the defendant's challenge to the statute. In passin0" we point out that the officer accused
the defendant of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code, and the provisions of that
code should have been followed by the officer in dealing with the purported viola:ion. The provisions of Sec. 41-6-166, U.
C.A.1953, are controlling in situations similar to the one herein. A pertinent part
of that section is as follows:
Whenever any person is arrested for
any violation of this act punishable as
a misdemeanor, the arrested person shall
be immediately taken before a magistrate
within the county in which the offense
charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of such
offense and is nearest or most accessible
with reference to the place where said
arrest is made, in any of the following
cases:
(1) When a person arrested demands
an immediate appearance before a magistrate.
*
*
*
*
*
*
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written
promise to appear in court as hereinafter
provided, or when in the discretion of the
arresting officer, a written promise to
appear is insufficient.
On appeal the defendant contends that
the statute under which he was charged
and convicted is invalid in view of the provisions of Article I, Section 14, of the
Ltah. Constitution, which reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure
l
n their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no
'• Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d S89.
2
4

Henry Vm rjm s., 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168,
L.Ed.2d 134; Wong Sun v. U. S.t 371 U.S.
541 P^d—51
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warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
While the particular problem raised has
not been before this court, the language
of the Utah Constitution was taken verbatim from the language of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. The United States Supreme Court in dealing with the particular
problem in the case of Terry v. Ohio,1 at
page 16 of the U. S. Reports, 88 S.Ct. at
page 1877 had this to say: "It is quite plain
that the Fourth Amendment covers 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate
in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime—'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away,
he has 'seized' that person." That case
went on to hold that arrests without a warrant may only be made upon probable cause.
Other decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court
are to the same effect. 2
The language of the particular statute
we are here dealing with is undoubtedly
subject to the constitutional challenge of
vagueness. That part of the statute "regardless of whether there is a legal basis
for the arrest" may be subject, to various
meanings and interpretations. If the intention of the legislature was to penalize
a law-abiding citizen by incarceration because he did not willingly submit to an unlawful arrest, a statute authorizing the
same is in violation of both the Utah and
United States Constitutions as above referred to in that it permits and authorizes
an arrest without probable cause and without lawful basis for the arrest, Likewise
the word "interferes" as used in the statute without further definition or elabora471, 83 S.Ct, 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Wright v.
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 10 L.
Ed.2d 349; People v. Curtis, 70 CalJ>d 347,
74 CaLRptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33.

802

t'tah

541 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

tion may mean any protest or verbal remonstration with an officer as well as the employment of physical force to avoid an arrest. We are of the opinion that the language of the statute as above pointed out
fails to inform an ordinary citizen who is
seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct
sought to be proscribed. The statute in the
particulars above referred to is in violation
of the Constitution of this State and the
United States and therefore invalid.
This matter is reversed and remanded to
the district court to dismiss the complaint.
M A U G H A N , J., concurs.
H E N R I O D , Chief Justice (concurring).
I concur, the while conceding that this
may be a close case, and that the arguments of the dissents about law and order
and the integrity of the constabulary, are
peals of optimism for a desired socio-political community. Nonetheless, I am convinced that they have neglected the liberty
bell, whose chimes presumably reach the
ears not only of the shackler but the shacklee, and presumably reflect each's constitutional prerogative of equality,—the hallmark of which is reasonableness. I take
it that any set of circumstances that outdistances such sounds might be said to
constitute a journey out of the realm of
constitutionality as we understand it.
In this case the officer in the first instance said he was going to issue the defendant a citation for driving while his license was suspended. He did not arrest
him, or threaten him with an arrest. Millions of citations are issued daily without
an arrest. The defendant did not object
to a citation, nor did he resist an arrest at
that time, but drove away a short distance
followed by the officer, who arrested him,
claiming he resisted arrest,—not borne out
by the facts. 1
I. One of the dissents suggests that we must
ignore the facts, they being the function of
the jury. Another suggestion seems apropos
that without the facts, the unconstitutionality
of a statute is a subject only of a declaratory

The confrontation here was attended by
the officer drawing his pistol,—necessary
perhaps, in a television scenario, but hardly under the circumstances of this case.
True it is, as the dissent urges, that the
circumstances of a case may have nothing
to do with the constitutionality of a statute,
—but they may have everything to do with
the question of unconstitutionality of a statute applicable to the facts and basic issue
here. They had a lot to do with Hitlerism,
and in my opinion, the subject statute conceivably may be knocking at the door of
some such eventuality. In such case I differ with my dissenting learned colleagues
to the effect that the prevailing presumption is in favor of constitutionality justifying a six-month stretch in jail. In my book,
where there is a statute that sanctions an
arrest of a citizen by a "recognized" law
enforcement officer, popularly looked upon as a person in a blue, brass-buttoned
suit, ornamented with a silver* star over his
heart (but who may be an imposter in rented garb), which citizen is minding his own
business, as here, where the non-interference was non-violent but simply by driving
away, "regardless of whether there is a
legal basis for the arrest or not, as was the
case here, just has to be unconstitutional.
In such case, the presumption in favor of
constitutionality successfully is rebutted,
and as generally is the rule, disappears, and
the presumption of innocence that always
attends a defendant, destroys the former,
the latter to persist. Facts well may be
instrumental in its persistence.
The dissents say there is no constitutional
question here since there is no search
and seizure problem involved. The main
opinion points to Terry v. Ohio 2 and other
authorities 3 that seem to disagree,—which
authorities have my preference over such
unsupported generality.
judgement that ignores the fact of constitutional right of liberty.
2. Footnote 1, main opinion.
3. Footnote 2, main opinion.
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• refoec:fully disagree with the gratuity
.„ c n e oi the dissents to the effect that
A'owhere in the statute can it be found
•hat an unreasonable arrest is permitted or
encouraged." I suggest the subject statute
scth permits and encourages an unreason2v;e—and I think unconstitutional—arrest
when it says it is unlawful to interfere with
4
who tries
a -jaw enforcement official,"
:o make an arrest "whether there is a legal
bcsis for the arrest" or not. In other
•xords, a peaceful citizen is forced by legislation to become his own jail bait if he "interferes" 5 with a law enforcement official
making an arrest, no matter how outrageous, vicious or stupid it may be,—and if
such citizen uses means that the statute
sterns by implication or legerdemain, to be
in arbitrary exercise of poor judgment,
but in doing so interferes with an officer,
—it costs him six months deprivation of
his liberty.
Consider also, the case where an overzealous, eager officer obviously is using
excessive force to subdue a teenager to the
point where bystanders honestly believe he
is about to kill him, or where a drunken
officer with a badge is arresting and beating a perfectly innocent citizen, or where
a cop at a football stadium goes berserk
and at the point of a gun attempts to arrest everyone in front of him, or a game
warden, in a remote wilderness area, out
of sheer suspicion manhandles a hunter
minding his own business, or an off-duty
law enforcement officer in civilian clothes,
but "recognized" as a Bobbie, tries to arrest his neighbor on a trumped-up charge,
or this very case, where the officer arrested an innocent person who had a valid
teense, who offered no interference what*• Vvhich could be numbered in the dozens, such
w sheriffs, deputies, city policemen, town
Policemen, school crossing guards, constables,
town marshals, judges of various ttues, game
hardens, treasury agents, tax collectors, camPus policemen, truant officers, forest rangers,
Justices of the peace, district court judges,
v-upreme Court Justices, sanitarians, agriculural agents, special police, meter maids, etc.,
a
d infinitum.

ever except to touch his fellow townsman,
an officer, and actually walked away from
an incident that the officer, not he, created.
The facts and hypothetics recited here
are not for the purpose of deciding this
case on the facts, which one of the dissents
erroneously said we could do, but to demonstrate the vagueness of the statute, and
the door it opens ostensibly, on a pretext
of false constitutionality, to events leading
to an unconstitutional invasion of the constitutional right against unreasonable seizure, a guaranteed right of privacy and a
constitutional assurance of right of free locomotion and freedom from harassment and
incarceration,—all in virtue of a statute
that presents a ridiculous discrimination in
favor of a law enforcement official and
against an erstwhile law-abiding citizen
who becomes a jailbird at the expense of
the mistaken, and what is worse, the illegal
act of an arresting official. T o me this
adds up to an Eleventh Commandment, to
go hence and defy the law hiding behind
a badge, and let him who is without sin,
but interferes in the lawlessness, to serve
the sentence.
It seems to me to be somewhat of a departure from reality and practicality and
even morality to say a statute is constitutional that says one person can violate the
law and by virtue of such illegal act induce
another to indulge in a confrontation which
he did not seek and get six months because
a possible tormenter, acting illegally, goaded him into it. It is a rather superficial
answer to say, as do the dissenters here,
that having perhaps unwittingly "interfered" in an arrest, with the sometimes
ludicrous and chameleonic meaning that
. •'Interferes" carries with it a multiple connotation so vague as to render a statute unconstitutional, in my opinion. Does one interfere with an officer if he heckles him, refuses
to leave the scene of a demonstration in which
a person is being arrested, is a curiosity
seeker at a fire where a suspected arsonist is
being apprehended, a physician attempting to
administer to a dying man who is being arrested, etc.?
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someone "might" attach to the word, the
"interferer," acting in good faith, not having read this funny statute, should be content to lose his job, his good name in the
community, his liberty for six months, and
his respect for the establishment, in exchange for the great privilege of hiring a
lawyer, going to court to seek damages
(which are no substitute for loss of freedom),—all because one of the countless
hordes of law enforcement officials not only committed a pediculous, but illegal rip-off
in making what is worse, the arrest of a
person who at common law had a perfect
right to resist, and who, but for this paternalistic, autocratic legislation in a free
society, could resist arrest, and who as of
now, can resist arrest if it happens to be
classified as a citizen's arrest.
This statute does not have any semblance
of a reasonable, constitutional statute prefaced by a warning requirement of some
kind, a reasonable request that the citizen
show something, or that under the circumstances "probable cause" appears to justify
an arrest, or "that there is reason to believe an offense has been or is about to
be committed."
One of the dissents asserts that it appears that the majority "is influenced by
the facts of the case and seeks an impermissible way to correct what it considers a
bad verdict." Although this statement may
be permissible gratuity as to others in the
majority triumvirate, it is not so as to this
author, since he was influenced by the provisions of the statute as being a constitutionally impermissible way to correct what
I consider to be a bad and vague treatment
of a citizen's constitutional right.
One of the dissents suggests that "The
main opinion is at some pains to explain
how the police officer could have handled
this apparently arrogant and belligerent
defendant in a different manner." It does
not take much imagination to answer that
question. The officer easily could have
6. Two other cases cited in the dissent, Rosenberg v. State, and State v. Byrne, are Florida
cases decided in Appellate Division Courts, inferior courts not having the authoritative

checked with the Motor Vehicle De«ar
ment, to determine if his fellow townsrroa
had a valid license, in which event he WGU'H
have found that he did have such lic»^^.
Or he calmly could have handed a citaticto defendant or placed it on his car, or left
it at his home, or mailed it to him. It jJ
suggested that the dissent "is at some pains*
to explain why the officer did not do on*
of the things mentioned above, or why
impetuous, unreasonable police officer
threatened the defendant by drawing hisgun, and why he committed a breach of
the peace in the process of what proved to
be an unlawful arrest,—an act the prevention of which the dissents both say was
the very purpose of the statute they say i$'
salutary in keeping the peace.
In passing, it is noted that neither of the
dissents cites any authority that really suj>ports the rule provided in the statute here.
One, Miller z\ State, a 1969 Alaska case
(462 P.2d 421), at first blush would seen
to. It may be pointed out, however, that
the court there laid down a rule of law
having no codification, which was similar]
to the provisions of our statute, saying that'
at least one state court had recommended,
such a rule as a matter of its common law
development, being State v. Koonce, 89
N J . S u p e r . 169, 214 A.2d 428, 1965,—an intermediate court but not the court of last
resort, the New Jersey Supreme Court
However, the Miller case, supra, pulled
its punches on any constitutionality question, which was not even raised in the case,
when it said "It should be noted that the
rule we formulate today has no application
when the arrestee apprehends bodily injury, or when an unlawful arrest is attempted by one not known to be a peace officer.
Quite different problems are then present
On the strength of such hedging, it is suggested that this case, the only one cited in
the dissent, certainly would be undispositive
in an attack on a statute's constitutionality
on the ground of vagueness. 8
wefeht of the Florida Supreme Court, havinl
the same subordinate stature of State *
Koonce, supra.
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: am oi the opinion the statute cannot
..•3~.c a true test of constitutionality based
/<rhe? o n a c ^ m or" 1) vagueness or 2) un'caionable seizure.
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting).
I can agree that there was no basis for
j n arrest, but cannot agree that the statute
is contrary to the provision of our constitution. It does not permit an unlawful seizure (arrest). It merely transfers the right
of redress for a wrongful arrest to the orderly procedure of a court trial instead of
a brawl in the streets. 1
The question of lawfulness of an arrest
may be a close one, and a brawl may result
in a killing. The legislature was wise in
passing the statute in question in the interest of maintaining order and preventing
confrontations which might lead to bloodshed. Nowhere in the statute can it be
found that an unreasonable seizure (arrest) is permitted or encouraged. There is
no change in the law that one making an
unlawful arrest must answer for it, and
so there is no basis for saying the statute
conflicts with the Constitution.
The common law gave a person the right
to resist an unlawful arrest, but times have
changed since the time when self-help was
permitted to prevent a wrongful arrest.
At common law, arrests were often made
by citizens. Judges were not available for
speedy release on bond, and trials were long
delayed. Such conditions no longer exist.
An arrested person must be taken forthwith before a magistrate, and trials must
not be unreasonably delayed. 2 A defend'• Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska
1969) ; Rosenberg v. State, 264 So.2d 68;
State v. Byrne, 311 So.2d 764; See Annotation in 44 A.L.R. 3rd at p. 1087 for cases
holding it a crime to resist a known officer
when making an arrest even absent a statute
like ours.
2

- Art. I, Sec. 12, Utah Const.

3

- Art. I, Sec. 9, Utah Const.

4

- Art. VIII, Sec. 9, Utah Const.

5

- Sec. 78-3-5, U.C.A.1953.

ant is entitled to bail in a reasonable
amount. 3 Besides the statute does not prevent resistance to an unlawful arrest when
made by a private person. It only applies
to arrests made by a known police officer.
By both our constitution 4 and statute, 5
the ruling of the district court in cases appealed from a justice of the peace court is
final except as to cases involving the constitutionality of a statute. 6 This matter is
such a case, and so we must limit our review to the determination of whether the
statute is invalid. We may not review the
facts of the case.
It appears that the prevailing opinion is
influenced by the facts of the case and
seeks an impermissible way to correct what
it considers a bad verdict.
That is the function of the trial court—
not that of an appellate tribunal. If we
wish to be jurors, we should renounce our
position as justices and wait until our
names are drawn for jury service.
In reviewing a statute to ascertain its
constitutionality, certain rules of construction must be applied:
(a) A legislative enactment is presumed
to bs valid and in conformity with the constitution. 7
(b) It should not be held to be invalid unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt
to be incompatible with some particular
constitutional provision. 8
(c) The burden of showing invalidity
of an ordinance or statute is upon the one
who makes the challenge. 9
6. Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 48 P.
41, affd. 173 U.S. 32, 19 S.Ct. 317, 43 L.Ed.
603; (1897) ; State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563,
200 P. S94, 26 A.L.R. 696 (1921) ; American
Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P.
249 (1930).
7. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers,
Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968) ;
Smw v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.24
234 (1948).
8. Cases cited note 1 3upra.
9. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers,
Tnn supra
oiir
Inc.,
note 7.
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In the case of State v. Packard10
said:

it was

It is recognized that statutes should not
be declared unconstitutional if there is
any reasonable basis upon which they may
be sustained as falling within the constitutional framework [citations omitted], and that a statute will not be held
void for uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect may be given it.
[Citations omitted].
The Supreme Court of the United States
in Roth v. U. S11 said:
. . . This Court, however, has consistently held that lack of precision is
not itself offensive to the requirement
of due process. ". . . [T]he Constitution does not require impossible
standards"; all that is required is that
the language "conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practices
.
.
."
United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S.
Ct. 1538,91 L.Ed. 1877.
The case of Sunset Amusement Co. v.
Board of Police Commissioners of City of
Los Angeles12 is in point:
It should be kept in mind
that there are an infinite variety of activities or conduct which could result in
potential or actual danger to the "peace.
health, safety, convenience, good morals,
and general welfare" of the public. A
municipality cannot reasonably be expected to isolate and specify those precise
activities or conduct which are intended
to be proscribed. As stated in Daniel
[Daniel v. Board of Police Com'rs, 190
Cal.App.2d 566, 12 Cal.Rptr. 226] quoting
from an earlier case, "To make a statute
sufficiently certain to comply with con10. 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 561, 563
(1952).
Ilu 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312
lL.Ed.2dl498 Q956).

stitutional requirements [of due proceu
of law] it is not necessary tha: it fUr
nishes detailed plans and speci:;cati 0r
of the acts or conduct prohibited**
The author of the prevailing opinion anparently doubts that the statute violates the
constitutional provision regarding unreasonable seizures as claimed by the app€\9
lant. H e seems to buttress the decision on
the constitutional challenge of vagueness
This claim is personal to the author of the
opinion, and was not raised either at trial
or on appeal.
I can see nothing vague about the language of the statute in question. Any person of ordinary intelligence should know
that when a known officer is making, or
attempting to make, an arrest, self-help or
lay interference is prohibited by the law.
In my opinion the statute is not unconstitutional, and we are duty bound to so
say and to affirm the judgment.
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting).
With due respect to our disagreeing colleagues, I am impelled to state that the raa-^
jority opinion impresses me as a strained
effort to cast the statute in a light different
from its true intent and meaning for tht
purpose of making it appear to be unconstitutional and striking it down. It is my'
judgment that such a ruling is contrary to
sound principles of law and considerations
of policy. In addition to the cogent and
correct observations of Justice Ellett, including: that a legislative enactment should
not be so nullified unless it is violative of
some constitutional provision beyond a reasonable doubt, I offer some further comments.
First, I re-emphasize that this statmc
does not authorize a peace officer to ma*t
12. 7 Cal.3d te, 101 Cal.Rptr. 768, 773, 496
P.2d 840, 8Ao (1972).
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.jniazvful arrest. Nor does it authorize
.- e seizure of any person or property. It
:-e- not deal with when or under what cir...prances the lawful arrest may be made.
T-.a: subject is dealt with elsewhere in the
'aw.1 Neither does it in any way adversely affect or deprive any person who is subjected to an improper or unlawful arrest
o: any right or remedy he has always had
under the law. It seems inescapably plain
:o me that the sole purpose of this statute
is to safeguard against interference with a
tcjice officer zi'ho is attempting to make
211 arrest, to the end that violence may be
avoided.
This statute may be different than you
or I. or the other justices of this court may
desire it to be, or would have drafted it,
had that been their responsibility. But I
certainly do not think it is beyond the realm
of rationality to see it as the expressed will
of the people of this State, acting through
their legislature, that when any duly authorized peace officer is attempting to
make an arrest, no citizen should interfere
with him. If the arrest proves to be improper or unlawful, whoever is aggrieved
thereby is not without the remedies the law
gives him, both in that case if it comes to
court, and/or in another if he wants to sue.
All this statute does is to make it a misdemeanor if he presumes to judge the lawfulness of the arrest, and interferes with
the officer in the performance of his duty.
In considering whether it is within the
power of the state legislature to enact such
a statute it is important to have in mind
that, as contrasted to the federal government, which has only those powers expressly granted to it, the legislature of this State
has all of the powers of sovereignty, except only as expressly limited or prohibited
!

- See Title 77, Ch. 13, Utah Code Ann.1953.

2- To avoid repetition on this subject here,
see statement in Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d
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by the constitution.' 3 It therefore has the
power to enact any law or regulation calculated to preserve the peace and good order of the citizenry, unless some constitutional provision prohibits it.
The provision of our Constitution quoted
and relied on as nullifying the statute is
Section 14, Article I, relating to searches
and seizures.
It is submitted that if that
section is considered in its total context,
as rules of construction require, it will be
seen that the purpose of that section is in
accordance with its title "Unreasonable
searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant";
and that it is dealing with the invasion of
privacy by unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, houses, papers and effects
and when the issuance of a warrant is
necessary for that purpose, and not with
the matter of making an arrest of the nature involved here. I therefore do not see
how that constitutional provision can properly be regarded as preventing the legislature from enacting a peace and good order
statute such as the one in question, nor
how it has any application to the situation
dealt with in this case.
We should look at the composite of this
fact situation in a light supportive of the
jury verdict, approved by the trial court
in his denial of motion to set it aside. But,
let it be conceded that the police officer
may have been mistaken concerning the defendant's having a revoked driver's license.
The main opinion is at some pains to explain how the police officer could have
handled this apparently arrogant and insolent defendant in a different manner. It
wholly ignores the proposition that if this
defendant had not been a person of that
disposition, and if he had a valid driver's
license on him as the law requires, he could
359, 374 P.2d 516, and authorities therein
cited.
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have avoided any difficulty for himself
or the police officer by simply so stating
and exhibiting the license. But he chose
t h t contrary course which resulted m the
difficulty in which he finds himself.
I cannot see it as consistent with my judicial duty in the light of what I regard
as correct principles of law and sound policy
to align myself with the position of this
defendant who obviously manifests a disposition to flout the law and authority, and
place the burden of exemplary behavior
on the peace officer who is trying to enforce and uphold it. It is my impression
that, quite different from the view taken
by the jurors and the trial judge, the possibility exists that some members of the
court may view the fact situation in this
case as offensive to their sense of justice.
If this be so, and the ends of justice require overturning the verdict, this court
could very well do so by deciding that the
peace officer was wrong and that there
was no justification for finding that the
defendant was "interfering" with the peace
officer making an arrest. I could not agree
with that solution, believing that to be the
prerogative of the jury and the trial court.
But in my judgment that would be a solution more nearly rational and in conformity
with proper judicial function and prerogative than to strike the statute down to rectify one seemingly harsh case. This would
also be in harmony with the well-established principle of constitutional l a w : that
the court should not declare a statute unconstitutional if the case can be decided on
other grounds. 3
In any event, it should be indicated that
it is unconstitutional only as apptttd when
a person resists arrest as to himself or his
family, and not remove its effect from other situations where its salutary purpose
should be preserved.

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Lewis A. BANKS, Jr., Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 13996.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 2, 1975.

Defendant was convicted after trial by
jury in the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Gordon R. Hall, J., of aggravated
assault.
Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court held that it was not error to
admit into evidence a pistol which had
been seized in close proximity to where defendant was arrested and which was sufficiently similar to the gun used that gun admitted into evidence could serve for illustrative purposes.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <S=>404(4)
In prosecution wherein defendant was
convicted of aggravated assault, it was not
error to admit into evidence pistol which
had been seized in close proximity to
where defendant was arrested and which
was sufficiently similar to gun used that
gun admitted into evidence could serve for
illustrative purposes. U.C.A.1953, 76-5102(1)(c), 76-5-103(1)(b), (2).
2. Searches and Seizures €=>3.3(5)
Where gun was found in close proximity to where defendant was arrested, officers had right to take it for their own
protection.

Jack W. Kunkler, Salt Lake Legal Dei t n d t r Assn., Salt L a k t City ior dtittv&ut
and appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F.
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City
for plaintiff and respondent.

3. See Heathman v. Giles, 18 Utah 2 368, 374 P.2d S39; 16 Am.Jur.2d 301.

42nd Utah State Legislature, House Bill No. 85, Recording No. 3, Side 1 (January 19,1981)
Sponsor Rep. Orval C. Harrison: This bill deals with the crime of resisting arrest. If you were to
look into your Utah Code to76-8-305 you would not find that statute in the book-instead it would
say unconstitutional. The (unintelligible) court in the case of State v. Bradshaw declared
unconstitutional the statute dealing with resisting arrest. I believe it was declared unlawful was
because primarily it did not require an affirmative showing by the prosecution that the arrest was
a lawful arrest. Consequently we have put together a statute here by the statewide association of
prosecutors that were involved in this which would now redefine this crime to require a lawful
arrest, (unintelligible) passed to you a memorandum that explains the situation what we are
trying to do is to get on the books a statute that would define the crime of resisting arrest. It
would require a lawful arrest and I would be glad to respond to any questions if there are any.
Mr. Speaker-Mr. Hilliard (unintelligible)
Mr. Hilliard: Mr. Speaker this is not to a (unintelligible) I had my light on before this bill in it
(unintelligible)
Mr Speaker: Mr. Gardner:
(Unintelligible)
Mr. Gardner: Could you tell me what an unlawful arrest is?
Sponsor: An unlawful arrest, of course, we are talking in general terms, would be an arrest when
the officer is attempting to effect an arrest did not have reasonable grounds or cause to do so
without probable cause and in anyway try to effect an arrest which is unlawful.
(Speaker's name is unitelligible):
I've guess what's covered here is not that I have told you concepts, but what is troubling me is
that there seems to me to be a matter of judgment to what is lawful or unlawful. I might think it
is unlawful because I have not done anything wrong and I guess how do-who makes the decision
as to whether there is sufficient reason.
Sponsor: Let me respond to that by indicating that what is or is not a lawful arrest I am sure is a
subject matter of numerous different philosophies and court decisions and I don't involve myself
in the practice of criminal law so I could not define it too well but I sure-as I-(unintelligible) the
ultimate decision as to what is a lawful arrest would be something decided by court decisions.
And, I might add that also the statute we have here has been patterned after a California statute
that has been declared to be Constitutional. -\ thank you.
Speaker: Representative Hilliard
Rep. Hilliard: would representative Harrison yield to another question.
Sponsor: Yes

Rep. Hilliard: Has consideration been given to the potential problem of a-say a knock on a door
at 2 o'clock in the morning and a man saying he is a police officer and then proceeding to come
into a home for some reason and you seek to protect yourself or your home a-(unintelligible) for
some protection(unintelligible) and a police officer to be either properly identified or some kind
of protection for a private citizen who may be concerned about somebody he does not know for
sure not to be a police officer?
Sponsor: Yes-a- the bill expressly requires that the person who is charged with the offense of
resisting a lawful arrest must have knowledge that the person is a police officer or else in the
exercise of reasonable care should have information sufficient to be put on notice that the
individual was a peace officer. So if the peace officer stops and identifies himself or if no
reasonable basis for the person charged to know it was a police officer then the elements of the
crime would not be made out.
Speaker: Representative Christensen:
Rep. Christensen: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I don't know how many of you have been arrested I
hope not that many- but by the record there were 304 (unintelligile) while they were trying to
arrest you and I for breaking the law. I think this is too high a number and I support this bill.
Speaker: I see no further lights of persons wishing to speak to the bill. Representative Harrison
would you like to sum up.
Harrison: I think that it has been adequately covered thank you.

